Entries by Daniel Meier-Greve

Formal acceptance under building law

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Contractual agreement on the performance of a formal acceptance procedure

Particularly in the case of complex (plant) construction projects, the contracting parties often agree – usually on the basis of the VOB/B – to carry out a so-called formal acceptance. The acceptance of a work performance means the recognition of the work as being essentially in accordance with the contract. Acceptance is particularly important in construction law. It is associated with considerable legal consequences, such as

  • the transfer of risk,
  • a reversal of the burden of proof with regard to the existence of defects and
  • the end of the fulfillment stage.

In addition, a significant part of the remuneration claim regularly requires prior acceptance.

The following article deals with the question of what such a formal acceptance is actually all about.

The essence of formal acceptance

The central feature of formal acceptance is that the parties have expressly agreed on the receipt of a corresponding declaration of intent requiring receipt as a declaration of acceptance.

Statutory and/or contractual acceptance requirements irrelevant if formal acceptance is agreed

In the event of an agreement on express acceptance (formal acceptance is a special form of express acceptance), the statutory and/or contractual acceptance requirements are not a prerequisite for the effects of acceptance to occur.

The customer is therefore free to accept a work even if the conditions for acceptance, i.e. readiness for acceptance, are not met (examples: work still incomplete, significant defects, etc.).

Other forms of acceptance (initially) excluded

Acceptance is generally possible in various ways. For example, acceptance can also take place implicitly (through conclusive behavior) or by the contractor not accepting the work despite proper completion of the work and an unsuccessfully set deadline for acceptance (so-called fictitious acceptance).

The agreement to carry out a formal acceptance then (initially) means that other forms of acceptance are excluded.

Carrying out the formal acceptance

There are no mandatory (legal) requirements for formal acceptance. However, it follows from the fact that formal acceptance requires the receipt of a corresponding express declaration of acceptance that a – not mandatory – joint acceptance meeting regularly takes place for the purpose of formal acceptance, the results of which are recorded in a protocol.

Formal requirements – minutes are sufficient

The declaration of acceptance can be made by the customer to the contractor in writing or verbally (also) independently of the preparation of a written record.

The formal requirements of formal acceptance are therefore satisfied in any case with the preparation of a protocol. Signatures under the minutes are therefore not required for the effectiveness of the acceptance and the occurrence of the acceptance effects, but are recommended.

Important: Subsequent waiver of formal acceptance possible

As already mentioned, the agreement of a formal acceptance means that other forms of acceptance are generally excluded. However, this only applies “initially”, because even if formal acceptance is contractually agreed, formal acceptance may be subsequently waived, either expressly or impliedly.

This may be the case, for example, if the client accepts the work without comment for several months or if, after a corresponding period of use of the work, it can no longer be expected that the client will demand formal acceptance after all(Havers, loc. cit., cf. also Keine in: Bock/Zons, Rechtshandbuch Anlagenbau, Part B, VII Acceptance, para. 42; Hilger/Kaminsky, Anlagenbau im In- und Ausland, para. 434).

The OLG Bamberg states in this regard:

“According to the prevailing opinion in case law and literature, acceptance by conclusive action through putting into use by the client (sic!) in accordance with § 12 No. 5 VOB/B even in the case of a formal acceptance agreement in the contract, if it can be established that the parties have waived the agreed acceptance by conclusive conduct (BGH NJW 93, 1063) (…)”. (OLG Bamberg, judgment of May 5, 1997 – 4 U 188/96 -, para. 9, juris)

The problem here is that, in contrast to conceivable fictitious acceptance by commissioning, where acceptance is fictitious regardless of the will of the client, tacit acceptance as a declaration of intent by the client presupposes a corresponding will to accept.

The BGH explains:

“In order to assume a tacit acceptance of work, however, facts must be established from which it is unambiguous that the parties have waived the agreed formal acceptance of work by conclusive conduct.” (BGH, judgment of 03.11.1992, ref.: X ZR 83/90 – this also concerned plant construction, EDP system)

Construction worker in protective uniform shaking hands with businessman in hardhat at construction

Refusal of acceptance only permissible in the event of significant defects – Unjustified refusal of acceptance nevertheless results in acceptance effects

The client may only refuse acceptance if the work to be accepted has significant defects. The corresponding provisions in Section 640 BGB and Section 12 (3) VOB/B are identical in this respect. The decisive question is whether the effects of acceptance occur or not. This is the case if acceptance was wrongly refused due to the absence of significant defects. All consequences of acceptance then occur even without the will of the client – regardless of whether the refusal of acceptance is provisional, conditional or final (see Messerschmidt in Messerschmidt/Voit, Privates Baurecht, § 640 BGB, para. 237 f.; Bröker loc. cit., para. 25 ff. in each case with further references).

It therefore depends on whether there is a significant defect. Please read my separate article.


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On the bias of judges in civil proceedings: If judges do not read a party’s pleadings, this can justify a motion for recusal!

Following on from my overview article on the application for recusal pursuant to Section 42 ZPO, I would like to report on an interesting ruling by the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe. According to this ruling, a judge’s failure to read the pleadings submitted by a party can give rise to concerns of bias. In the case in question, a judge had overlooked an application for recusal directed against him, as he had forwarded the pleading containing it unread to the opposing party for comment. This violates the so-called duty to wait pursuant to Section 47 (1) ZPO, according to which only “official acts that cannot be postponed” are permitted from the filing of an application for recusal until it has been dealt with.


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BGH on the legal consequences of thwarting evidence

In legal disputes, it often happens that one party makes it difficult for the opposing party to provide evidence. In these cases, the question then arises as to whether and, if so, with what legal consequences it can be assumed that evidence has been obstructed.


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Contract law: For the drafting of contracts in construction law

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Contract law: For the drafting of contracts in construction law - especially in plant construction

In construction law, especially in the area of plant construction, the general contractor regularly commissioned assumes very considerable risks. A charming way for them to limit these risks can be to pass on contracts or individual relevant contractual terms to their subcontractors.

In this case, the general contractor agrees with each of its subcontractors that all obligations arising from the general contractor agreement (main contract), insofar as they relate to the subcontractor’s work, will be “passed on” to the subcontractor. The general contractor thus passes on the relevant obligations 1:1 to its subcontractors.

The following article deals with the legal framework conditions of such a contract construction by means of the interposition of contracts, in particular with the question of the extent to which there could be concerns about the effectiveness of such a construction.

Fundamental permissibility of such a contractual arrangement

Contracts with subcontractors (subcontractor contracts) are generally independent construction contracts from which the rights and obligations arise independently of the main contract (Junghenn, Beck VOB-Kommentar, Part B, 3rd edition 2013, para. 24).

The transfer of the general contractor’s obligations towards the client arising from the main contract to subcontractors is, in principle, a legally possible contractual constellation that is used in practice:

This possibility arises, for example, from the VOB/B, regulated in § 4 para. 8: According to this, the contractor must provide the service in his own company, but he can also commission subcontractors without the consent of the client if the specific service does not fall within his area of expertise.

The latter is probably the rule, especially in plant construction. It is rare for a general contractor to have all of the necessary specialist skills for the construction of complex plants.

It is also a recognized option for the general contractor to outsource its work services in their entirety to subcontractors (Junghenn, Beck VOB-Kommentar, Teil B, 3rd edition 2013, para. 8). The general contractor then assumes a kind of intermediary function (Klaus Ramming: Überlegungen zur Ausgestaltung von Nachunternehmerverträgen durch AGB, BB 1994, Heft 8, 518).

Irrespective of this, the contractor and subcontractors can agree on provisions in the subcontractor contract that are identical in content and run in parallel to those found in the legally independent main contract between the contractor and its client; the contractor (often as a general contractor), which sits “between the two chairs” of client and subcontractor, inevitably has a justified interest in the parallel connection (synchronicity) of important provisions of the general contractor contract on the one hand and the subcontractor contract on the other (Junghenn, Beck VOB-Kommentar, Teil B, 3. Edition 2013, para. 24).

Finally, it is also legally possible to pass through provisions of the main contract by simple reference (Richter in Messerschmidt/Voit, Privates Baurecht, 2nd edition 2012, para. 238). This applies in any case to the synchronization of performance obligations (Kimmich/Bach VOB für Bauleiter, 6th edition 2014, para. 408).

Ineffectiveness in individual cases after GTC review

The only remaining problem in this context could be that the reference to the provisions of the main contract could lead to the application of GTC law in the respective individual case and thus to the possible invalidity of individual clauses.

If the inclusion of the provisions of the main contract in the subcontractor contract has not been negotiated, the law on general terms and conditions is likely to apply as a rule.

An ineffectiveness under GTC law can be considered, for example, when clauses on limitation periods, extraordinary termination rights and due dates are passed on (cf. compilation by Richter in Messerschmidt/Voit, Privates Baurecht, 2nd edition 2012, para. 240- 246).

Important: The provision of performance obligations is unobjectionable under GTC law!

However, with regard to the probably most important and at the same time most liable clause, namely the passing on of performance obligations, there are generally no concerns about effectiveness.

The reference to the main contract regarding the performance obligations should not constitute a GTC provision. In addition, such a reference should also be unobjectionable under GTC law.

The performance obligations regulated in the main contract do not generally constitute GTCs themselves, as these are always agreed individually between the client and the general contractor. This individual agreement also does not become GTC if it is agreed with several subcontractors by reference.

In any case, a review of the general terms and conditions with regard to the scope of services only takes place to a limited extent. It is limited to a pure transparency check, a content check does not take place.

Construction

Conclusion

Passing on contracts of the general contractor to subcontractors is permissible without any problems in the case of individual agreements.

In the case of general terms and conditions, problems may arise with the passage of individual clauses. However, this does not generally apply to the inclusion of the service description.


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On the bias of judges in civil proceedings: If judges do not read a party’s pleadings, this can justify a motion for recusal!

Following on from my overview article on the application for recusal pursuant to Section 42 ZPO, I would like to report on an interesting ruling by the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe. According to this ruling, a judge’s failure to read the pleadings submitted by a party can give rise to concerns of bias. In the case in question, a judge had overlooked an application for recusal directed against him, as he had forwarded the pleading containing it unread to the opposing party for comment. This violates the so-called duty to wait pursuant to Section 47 (1) ZPO, according to which only “official acts that cannot be postponed” are permitted from the filing of an application for recusal until it has been dealt with.


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BGH on the legal consequences of thwarting evidence

In legal disputes, it often happens that one party makes it difficult for the opposing party to provide evidence. In these cases, the question then arises as to whether and, if so, with what legal consequences it can be assumed that evidence has been obstructed.


Read more "


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Copyright 2026 © All rights reserved.

Influencer advertising: The legal confusion set in motion by the Association of Social Competition (VSW) continues.

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Influencer advertising: The legal confusion set in motion by the Association of Social Competition (VSW) continues.

In the case of Kathy Hummels, the Munich Regional Court (judgment of 29.4.2019, Ref. 4 HK O 14312/18) considers unpaid posts with product mentions to be obviously advertising and therefore not subject to labeling. This continues the legal confusion initiated by the Association of Social Competition (VSW) in the area of influencer advertising.

The judgment of the Munich Regional Court from 29.4.2019 (Ref. 4 HK O 14312/18)

In a ruling dated 29.4.2019, Munich Regional Court (case no. 4 HK O 14312/18) decided (source: press release 6/2019 dated 29.04.2019) that, in the case of influencers with a high profile such as Kathy Hummels, unpaid posts are also advertising. However, this is known to the target audience, which is why there is no labeling obligation. Accordingly, the Munich Regional Court dismissed the VSW’s claim.

The press release states:

The court ruled that the defendant’s posts were not disguised advertising. It is true that the defendant acted commercially because it promoted the linked companies and its own company through the posts. However, in the opinion of the court, the defendant’s Instagram account made this clear to the relevant public.”

The Munich Regional Court emphasized that a case-by-case decision must always be made on the question of whether a post is recognizably advertising (= no labeling obligation) or not (= then subject to labeling). The press release states:

The chamber emphasized that the recognizability of commercial activity must be examined in each individual case and that the decision should therefore not be generalized with regard to other bloggers or influencers. The decisive factors in this specific case included the number of followers of the defendant and the fact that it was a public, verified profile with a blue tick.”

Classification in the context of previous rulings on influencer advertising

The ruling of the Munich Regional Court continues the approving line of the Berlin Court of Appeal (ruling of 9.1.2019, Ref. 5 U 83/18). Contrary to the lower court, the Berlin Court of Appeal also ruled that in the Vreni Frost case, posts showing items of clothing, shoes and accessories etc. do not generally have to be labeled as advertising. The KG Berlin had stated:

“It can be assumed that websites such as the account operated by the defendant under “…” are visited because users are also interested in the clothes, shoes and accessories selected and combined by the blogger. The interest of the visitors is not limited to viewing pictures. Naturally, they are at least also interested in copying selections and combinations or finding inspiration for their own outfits. The information about the brand under which the presented products are offered and where they can be purchased answers an existing need for information.

The defendant’s explanation that she tags the depicted items of clothing, shoes and accessories in order to anticipate inquiries from visitors to her Instagram page therefore appears plausible. The defendant has also submitted examples of such requests (see Annex AG 21 to the defendant’s statement of May 23, 2018).

In this respect, nothing else applies than for fashion magazines, which contain corresponding information on manufacturers and sources of supply for the same reason (…).”

It should be noted that the Munich Regional Court continues the contradictory case law of German courts. It is becoming increasingly unclear whether and, if so, why or in which cases posts by influencers who present or mention products in their posts constitute advertising. The Munich Regional Court has added another aspect to the confusion by assuming advertising, but denying a labeling obligation if the presentation or the author of the post already makes the advertising character clear.

Social media influencer

Conclusion

It is to be hoped that the BGH will take up all the aspects assessed by the courts of lower instances in its ruling, which is expected soon, and provide full clarity.


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On the bias of judges in civil proceedings: If judges do not read a party’s pleadings, this can justify a motion for recusal!

Following on from my overview article on the application for recusal pursuant to Section 42 ZPO, I would like to report on an interesting ruling by the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe. According to this ruling, a judge’s failure to read the pleadings submitted by a party can give rise to concerns of bias. In the case in question, a judge had overlooked an application for recusal directed against him, as he had forwarded the pleading containing it unread to the opposing party for comment. This violates the so-called duty to wait pursuant to Section 47 (1) ZPO, according to which only “official acts that cannot be postponed” are permitted from the filing of an application for recusal until it has been dealt with.


Read more "

Files and evidence bag in a crime lab, conceptual image

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BGH on the legal consequences of thwarting evidence

In legal disputes, it often happens that one party makes it difficult for the opposing party to provide evidence. In these cases, the question then arises as to whether and, if so, with what legal consequences it can be assumed that evidence has been obstructed.


Read more "


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LEGAL+



+49 (40) 57199 74 80



+49 (170) 1203 74 0



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Copyright 2026 © All rights reserved.

Delegation of managerial duties

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Compliance guide: Delegation of directors' duties using the example of the AG management board

The following article is intended to provide an overview of the delegation of directors’ duties in AGs and GmbHs. The explanations are based on the AG management board, but are essentially transferable to GmbH management.

Compliance in the workplace. Folders labeled Compliance, Violations in focus.

Principle: all tasks of the Executive Board can be delegated

In principle, the Management Board can delegate its duties as the executive body of the AG without restriction. However, there are important exceptions to this principle. The following cannot be delegated:

  • The so-called overall responsibility of the members of the Executive Board is “indivisible, unlimited and inalienable,
  • Personal obligations enshrined in law, e.g: Reporting obligations, the obligation to prepare annual financial statements, the fulfillment of certain tax obligations, etc.,
  • Duties relating to resolutions of the Annual General Meeting, reporting to the Supervisory Board, convening the shareholders’ meeting, submitting transactions requiring approval to the Supervisory Board (Section 111 (4) sentence 2 AktG) and certain duties in connection with the annual financial statements, management report and proposal for the appropriation of profits,
  • The obligations pursuant to Section 91 (2) AktG, according to which the Management Board must take suitable measures to ensure that developments that could threaten the continued existence of the company are identified as early as possible (early risk detection system),
  • The duty of every Management Board member to “manage the company” in accordance with Section 76 (1) AktG; it follows that basic strategic decisions (corporate planning) must remain non-transferable to the Management Board,
  • The task of “providing the company with an organizational framework, structuring it into functional and coordinated units and ensuring the flow of information within the company (corporate coordination)”,
  • Within the following limits, the control of the proper execution of delegated management tasks (corporate control),
  • The decision on the filling of subordinate management positions in the company (management staffing).

In the event of a company crisis or in certain exceptional situations (such as an accumulation of loss events), all members of the Executive Board (even those who are otherwise not responsible) may have joint responsibility despite the fact that the allocation of responsibilities is in principle effective.

Obligation to delegate

It goes without saying that the delegation of duties, which is permissible in principle, does not automatically lead to the Executive Board being released from liability. Rather, the managing director has a comprehensive duty of control and supervision following the delegation. This applies in detail:

  • In all forms of delegation (horizontal, vertical or external), care must be taken to ensure that responsibilities are clearly and unambiguously assigned so that they can be clearly localized to specific individuals.
  • All tasks must be defined as precisely as possible and assigned without overlap.
  • The situation of “one relying on the other” must be avoided; everyone must know exactly what their duties are.
  • Ambiguities and gaps mean that the delegation is ineffective and the duty remains with the management as a whole.
  • It is therefore recommended that all delegations of board duties be set out in writing, for example in organizational charts and job descriptions

Selection

The following qualifications must be checked and ensured before tasks are assigned to a person in the company:

  • Personal aptitude (reliability, ability to work under pressure);
  • Professional competence (training, qualifications, experience) to fulfill the task to be performed (the more complex the task and the greater the risk of damage in the event of poor performance, the stricter the standard of care to be applied).

Briefing

Before the person to whom tasks have been assigned begins his or her work, it must be ensured:

  • Instruction in the area of responsibility in the required breadth and depth,
  • Provision of the necessary powers and material resources to accomplish the tasks,
  • Clarification of the task and the reporting lines,
  • Identification of particular hazards in the functional area,
  • Warning of typical errors

Monitoring

The duty to monitor includes:

Regular information

Regular information is required in order to learn as early as possible of facts that may indicate a lack of fulfillment of duties (information and communication task).

Establishment of a reporting system

It is advisable to set up a reporting system, the specific design of which is subject to broad discretion. However, it must ensure that at least serious deviations, such as regularly recurring serious misconduct or even criminal offenses, are detected.

Monitoring the delegation persons

The persons to whom delegation is made must be monitored and controlled on an ongoing basis in order to be able to intervene immediately if necessary. The monitoring of the persons to whom the Board of Directors has delegated responsibility can be delegated in turn – in particular to specialists. If these have been carefully selected and instructed and are equipped with the necessary human and material resources, structures and powers, the company director can “limit himself to monitoring the monitors” (meta-monitoring).

The so-called principle of trust applies: If the company manager has no concrete reason to doubt that the supervisors appointed by him are fulfilling their duties correctly, and if he has also ensured that he learns as reliably and early as possible of possible irregularities in the otherwise properly set up monitoring organization, he can trust in the functioning of this organization.

Ongoing control

Ongoing monitoring is required that is not limited to sporadic measures, but ensures that irregularities do not occur even without permanent close monitoring. This includes random checks that make it clear to employees that misconduct can be detected and sanctioned. The Management Board must appoint suitable and reliable persons and either check these themselves from time to time or have them checked by others, such as an auditing department. Random, surprise checks are necessary and regularly sufficient to prevent deliberate violations of legal regulations and instructions from the management. They make employees aware that violations can be detected and, if necessary, punished.

Increased monitoring in the event of grievances or exceptional situations

All monitoring measures must be intensified in the event of deficits, objective irregularities, crises or exceptional situations. However, if it is foreseeable that random checks will not be sufficient to achieve the aforementioned effect, e.g. because the review of only individual processes could not uncover any infringements, the entrepreneur is obliged to take other suitable supervisory measures. In such cases, it may be necessary to carry out surprisingly comprehensive business audits. The extent to which audits must be carried out in a specific case depends on the overall circumstances of the individual case. Increased supervisory measures are required in any case if irregularities have already occurred in the business or if this is to be expected due to special circumstances and also if important regulations or difficult legal issues are in question.


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On the bias of judges in civil proceedings: If judges do not read a party’s pleadings, this can justify a motion for recusal!

Following on from my overview article on the application for recusal pursuant to Section 42 ZPO, I would like to report on an interesting ruling by the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe. According to this ruling, a judge’s failure to read the pleadings submitted by a party can give rise to concerns of bias. In the case in question, a judge had overlooked an application for recusal directed against him, as he had forwarded the pleading containing it unread to the opposing party for comment. This violates the so-called duty to wait pursuant to Section 47 (1) ZPO, according to which only “official acts that cannot be postponed” are permitted from the filing of an application for recusal until it has been dealt with.


Read more "

Files and evidence bag in a crime lab, conceptual image

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BGH on the legal consequences of thwarting evidence

In legal disputes, it often happens that one party makes it difficult for the opposing party to provide evidence. In these cases, the question then arises as to whether and, if so, with what legal consequences it can be assumed that evidence has been obstructed.


Read more "


CONTACT

LEGAL+



+49 (40) 57199 74 80



+49 (170) 1203 74 0



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kontakt@legal-plus.eu


Benefit from my active network!

I look forward to our networking.

Copyright 2026 © All rights reserved.

Labeling of advertising in social media

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Labeling influencer advertising with Anglicisms in social media

Advertising must be clearly and unmistakably recognizable as advertising. Of course, this also applies undiminished to influencer advertising on social media.

The above also means that advertising content must be appropriately labeled if its advertising character is not already clear from the external circumstances. So far, so good.

However, the question of how any necessary labeling meets the legal requirements is highly controversial and the subject of numerous recent court decisions. This applies in particular to so-called influencer advertising in social media. Here, it is particularly controversial whether the labeling of advertising with Anglicisms in social media is sufficiently suitable to provide information about advertising content.

Social media influencer

Labeling requirements controversial

As mentioned at the beginning, case law requires that the labeling must clearly and unambiguously explain the advertising character. But what is “clear and unambiguous”?

The majority of case law is still of the opinion that advertising is only sufficiently clearly recognizable as such with the words “advertising” or “advertisement”. Frequently used terms such as “Sponsored (by)”, “Sponsored Content” or “Ad” are (still) rejected by the majority of courts as obscuring.

Scale of assessment: understanding of the primary target public

In the author’s opinion, this does not reflect the reality of life, at least in the area of new or social media:

Case law still agrees in this respect that the understanding of the target audience is decisive. For example, when it comes to assessing an Instagram post on the topic of lifestyle, it only depends on how the people who usually consume such content understand the label in question.

If this essentially undisputed standard is applied, there can be no serious doubt that labels such as “Sponsored (by)”, “Sponsored Content” or “Ad” are understood.

Unrealistic view of many courts

The reasons given by the courts, which still want to see things differently, seem downright comical. One example is a ruling by the Hamburg Regional Court from 21.12.2018 (case no. 315 O 257/17), which dealt with the labeling of “sponsored content”:

“The term translates as “supported content” and does not make it sufficiently clear that this editorial contribution is a commercial advertisement. In everyday language, the term “sponsor” is more commonly associated with a The term is associated with unselfish support for a project. The term is familiar from the world of sport; a jersey sponsor is someone who supports a sports project or a team and receives an advertising opportunity in return, for example on a team’s jersey. As a rule, the supportive element predominates; the sponsor hopes that his payment will contribute to the good image of the supported team.”

Today’s young generation, which has grown up with the internet and influencers (the so-called “always-on generation”), is familiar with terms such as “sponsored” from their everyday (internet) lives, certainly not from sport and in the context of supporting a project.

Based on this solely relevant target group, it is simply absurd that the label “Sponsored (Content)” or “Ad” is not sufficiently comprehensible.

The first higher court rulings with reference to the reality of life

A recent ruling by the Higher Regional Court of Celle from June 8, 2017 (Ref. 13 U 53/17) is therefore encouraging. The OLG Celle stated:

“The Senate leaves open whether the use of the hashtag “#ad” recommended by the Working Group of the State Media Authorities, among others, is generally suitable for identifying a post on Instagram or similar social media as advertising. The result of the opinion poll submitted by the plaintiff in the injunction as Annex BB 1 could raise doubts as to whether the hashtag “#ad” is sufficiently well-known to be understood as a clear reference to advertising from the perspective of an average consumer. However, the Senate does not fail to recognize that the opinion survey does not reveal which part of the respondents use Instagram or similar social media at all; those persons who, according to the plaintiff in the injunction, are primarily the target group of the advertising at issue, children and those aged 13 and over, were not taken into account in the survey.”

The OLG Celle has thus correctly worked out that

  • only the target group concerned is relevant for the assessment of understanding, and
  • the label “Ad” may very well be suitable for advertising labeling depending on the target group concerned.

Misrepresentation as a further prerequisite for an infringement of competition law

Misleading is another mandatory requirement for an infringement of competition law due to non-disclosure of advertising. This is because the “non-disclosure” of an advertisement must be capable of “inducing the consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise” (cf. Section 5a (6) UWG). Mere non-disclosure or allegedly inappropriate disclosure is therefore not sufficient for anti-competitive action. If one considers the extremely enlightened target group (“always-on” generation) in this regard, it also seems absurd from this point of view that advertising content from influencers on social networks marked with “Sponosred” or “Ad” could be anti-competitive. In most cases, this is even likely to be the case if there is no labeling at all, because the relevant target group is very familiar with the influencer business and any purchasing decisions are certainly not influenced by whether individual posts by an influencer are labeled as advertising or not.


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On the bias of judges in civil proceedings: If judges do not read a party’s pleadings, this can justify a motion for recusal!

Following on from my overview article on the application for recusal pursuant to Section 42 ZPO, I would like to report on an interesting ruling by the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe. According to this ruling, a judge’s failure to read the pleadings submitted by a party can give rise to concerns of bias. In the case in question, a judge had overlooked an application for recusal directed against him, as he had forwarded the pleading containing it unread to the opposing party for comment. This violates the so-called duty to wait pursuant to Section 47 (1) ZPO, according to which only “official acts that cannot be postponed” are permitted from the filing of an application for recusal until it has been dealt with.


Read more "

Files and evidence bag in a crime lab, conceptual image

Nicht kategorisiert


BGH on the legal consequences of thwarting evidence

In legal disputes, it often happens that one party makes it difficult for the opposing party to provide evidence. In these cases, the question then arises as to whether and, if so, with what legal consequences it can be assumed that evidence has been obstructed.


Read more "


CONTACT

LEGAL+



+49 (40) 57199 74 80



+49 (170) 1203 74 0



Neuer Wall 61 D-20354 Hamburg



kontakt@legal-plus.eu


Benefit from my active network!

I look forward to our networking.

Copyright 2026 © All rights reserved.

Karlsruhe Regional Court considers unpaid posts in the Pamela Reif case to be subject to labeling – ruling fundamentally contradicts the ruling of KG Berlin from 8.1.2019 (Ref. 5 U 83/18)

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The Regional Court of Karlsruhe (judgment of 21.3.2019, Ref. 13 O 38/18 KfH) considers unpaid posts in the Pamela Reif case to be subject to labeling - judgment fundamentally contradicts the judgment of the KG Berlin of 8.1.2019 (Ref. 5 U 83/18)

The chaos surrounding the influencer scene initiated by the Association of Social Competition (VSW) continues. In the Pamela Reif case, the Karslruhe Regional Court also considers unpaid posts to be subject to mandatory labeling. In doing so, the Regional Court of Karslruhe has fundamentally contradicted the ruling of the KG Berlin in the Vreni Frost case, which was only issued in January and fortunately takes a differentiated view.

Influencers vlogging from home

The judgment of the Regional Court of Karlsruhe (Ref. 13 O 38/18 KfH)

In its ruling of March 21, 2019, the Regional Court of Karlsruhe (Ref. 13 O 38/18 KfH) decided (see Karlsruhe Regional Court press release) that influencers – here: Pamela Reif – must also label unpaid posts as advertising if these posts are also intended to promote their own business activities as an influencer.

The press release states:

“The court considers the defendant’s actions to be an infringement of competition law. The defendant’s posts arouse interest in the items of clothing worn etc.. By enabling users to access the manufacturer’s website with just two clicks, the image and sales of the respective manufacturer are promoted. The fact that the defendant primarily wants to avoid questions from followers (“Where did you get your dress?”) by tagging does not contradict the business purpose pursued at the same time.
(…)
It is the nature of influencer advertising that the influencer always simultaneously works on his image and authenticity, for which he promotes the appropriate brands and articles, and “cultivates” the circle of his followers, who value his credibility and want to be part of “their” influencer’s community. In this respect, the defendant always promotes its own business activities through its posts. This is because companies are interested in the most credible advertising media possible for their advertising.

Labeling as advertising is also not dispensable. Under no circumstances do all followers know how to assess the advertising character of influencers’ appearances; this applies in particular to the defendant’s subscribers, some of whom are very young.”

Contradiction to the appeal judgment of the KG Berlin (“Vreni Frost”, Ref. 5 U 83/18)

The Regional Court of Karlsruhe is thus clearly contradicting the ruling of the Berlin Court of Appeal of 9 January 2019 (Vreni Frost ruling), which fortunately set the record straight in favor of influencers:

In the point of interest here, the Court of Appeal overturned the first-instance judgment against Vreni Frost and – in my opinion correctly – found that posts showing items of clothing, shoes and accessories etc. do not generally have to be labeled as advertising. The KG Berlin stated (judgment of January 8, 2019, Ref. 5 U 83/18; emphasis added by the author):

“It can be assumed that websites such as the account operated by the defendant under “…” are visited because users are also interested in the clothes, shoes and accessories selected and combined by the blogger. The interest of the visitors is not limited to viewing pictures. Naturally, they are at least also interested in copying selections and combinations or finding inspiration for their own outfits. The information about the brand under which the presented products are offered and where they can be purchased answers an existing need for information.

The defendant’s explanation that she tags the depicted items of clothing, shoes and accessories in order to anticipate inquiries from visitors to her Instagram page therefore appears plausible. The defendant has also submitted examples of such requests (see Annex AG 21 to the defendant’s statement of May 23, 2018).

In this respect, the same applies as for fashion magazines, which contain corresponding information on manufacturers and sources of supply for the same reason. This is clearly illustrated by the information provided by the defendant in Exhibit BK 7 to its written submission of December 27, 2018. In addition to the products depicted, not only the manufacturer of the products is named there, but also internet addresses from which the products can be obtained.”

Furthermore, the KG Berlin correctly stated (emphasis added by the author):

“The ambition of an influencer to generate advertising revenue does not justify obliging him to provide every statement with a reference with which the public associates a subordinate or inferior value of the contribution. In this respect, nothing else can apply to an influencer than to other media companies, which are consistently financed at least by advertising revenue and are particularly attractive to clients if they reach a large number of people, regardless of whether they are referred to as readers, viewers or followers.

A differentiation according to the subject matter of the editorial reporting or the expression of opinion is not compatible with freedom of expression and media freedom. Reports on fashion trends are no less worthy of protection than reports on socio-political and daily political topics.”

Rating

While the KG Berlin had fortunately finally clarified in court that influencers such as Vreni Frost, Pamela Reif and others do nothing different from conventional fashion magazines despite the different environment, the LG Karlsruhe – like other courts before it – misjudged precisely this crucial point. The Regional Court of Karlsruhe denies influencers who report on fashion via platforms such as YouTube or Instagram rights that have always been granted to conventional publishers who report primarily on fashion in magazines with the same content as the influencers in question here. The Karlsruhe Regional Court’s view is all the more incomprehensible when you consider that influencers have always existed as ambassadors for brands and have been used by traditional print media for a long time. One example is the magazine “Barbara”, which is based on the influencer Barbara Schöneberger. Ms. Schöneberger ultimately does nothing different in “Barbara” than Pamela Reif on Instagram.

Conclusion/Outlook

It is to be hoped that the BGH will continue the case law of the KG Berlin in its ruling, which is expected soon.

In my view, it is almost speechless that a large number of German courts are clearly unable to correctly classify the types of media that have become possible via the internet (cf. the article in the Handelsblatt of 15/16/17 March 2019). The result of this inability is currently legal discrimination against so-called influencers.

Social media influencer


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On the bias of judges in civil proceedings: If judges do not read a party’s pleadings, this can justify a motion for recusal!

Following on from my overview article on the application for recusal pursuant to Section 42 ZPO, I would like to report on an interesting ruling by the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe. According to this ruling, a judge’s failure to read the pleadings submitted by a party can give rise to concerns of bias. In the case in question, a judge had overlooked an application for recusal directed against him, as he had forwarded the pleading containing it unread to the opposing party for comment. This violates the so-called duty to wait pursuant to Section 47 (1) ZPO, according to which only “official acts that cannot be postponed” are permitted from the filing of an application for recusal until it has been dealt with.


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BGH on the legal consequences of thwarting evidence

In legal disputes, it often happens that one party makes it difficult for the opposing party to provide evidence. In these cases, the question then arises as to whether and, if so, with what legal consequences it can be assumed that evidence has been obstructed.


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“Handelsblatt” report from March 15/16/17, 2019 confirms the questionable nature of the action taken by the Association of Social Competition (VSW) against influencers

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"Handelsblatt" report from March 15/16/17, 2019 confirms the questionable nature of the action taken by the Association of Social Competition (VSW) against influencers

In my blog post Can so-called warning associations do anything? – On the liability for damages of warning associations such as the Association of Social Competition (VSW)” I had already reported from practical experience on the fact that so-called warning associations – covered by the courts – are still acting to the detriment of market participants.

Social media influencer

With its recent action against influencers, the Association of Social Competition (VSW) has attracted a lot of media attention and thus – unintentionally – finally brought movement to the question of what warning associations may and may not do. The “Handelsblatt” has now – also with my support – in its latest weekend edition of March 15/16/17, 2019 provided valuable clarification regarding the questionable actions of the VSW.

The legal consequence of the actions of VSW and, of course, of any other warning association can be, as I have explained in my article mentioned above above, may include an obligation to pay damages to injured market participants.


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On the bias of judges in civil proceedings: If judges do not read a party’s pleadings, this can justify a motion for recusal!

Following on from my overview article on the application for recusal pursuant to Section 42 ZPO, I would like to report on an interesting ruling by the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe. According to this ruling, a judge’s failure to read the pleadings submitted by a party can give rise to concerns of bias. In the case in question, a judge had overlooked an application for recusal directed against him, as he had forwarded the pleading containing it unread to the opposing party for comment. This violates the so-called duty to wait pursuant to Section 47 (1) ZPO, according to which only “official acts that cannot be postponed” are permitted from the filing of an application for recusal until it has been dealt with.


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BGH on the legal consequences of thwarting evidence

In legal disputes, it often happens that one party makes it difficult for the opposing party to provide evidence. In these cases, the question then arises as to whether and, if so, with what legal consequences it can be assumed that evidence has been obstructed.


Read more "


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+49 (170) 1203 74 0



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Conditions of carriage for letters: Liability of Swiss Post for the loss of a registered letter

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Conditions of carriage for letters: Liability of Swiss Post for the loss of a registered letter

The question of liability for registered mail sent by Deutsche Post is becoming more and more important, as in the real world of amazon, ebay & Co. goods are increasingly being sent as e.g. registered maxi letters. This is when the question of whether and, if so, to what extent liability on the part of the postal service can be considered comes into play. This is the subject of the following article.

The problem

Ordinary letters generally only contain declarations of intent with no material value. The question of liability in the event of loss is therefore of no practical significance. The situation is different with registered letters, which in today’s economic reality are increasingly being used to send consignments of goods. Considering that an additional fee is charged for registered mail and that acceptance and delivery – as with parcels – take place in person, the question arises as to whether the principles of liability that also apply to other consignments of goods (e.g. parcels) should at least apply accordingly. In 2006, the Bonn District Court on March 29, 2006 and the Federal Court of Justice on June 14, 2006 had to deal with this issue in quick succession. Of particular practical relevance is whether the postal service has a so-called duty of admission in the case of registered letters, i.e. the duty to explain the circumstances of the loss. In the aforementioned judgment, the BGH took a “post-friendly” and at the same time dubious position. The Bonn Local Court took a different approach – and rightly so, as the author will explain below.

Checkig shipping info

What does the law say?

The legislator has privileged the postal service with regard to the transportation of “letters and letter-like items” under liability law. This is expressed in Section 449 HGB and is explained in the explanatory memorandum to the law:

449 HGB:

(1) Insofar as the contract of carriage does not relate to the carriage of letters or consignments similar to letters, the liability provisions in section 413 paragraph 2, sections 414, 418 paragraph 6, section 422 paragraph 3, sections 425 to 438, 445 paragraph 3 and section 446 paragraph 2 may be deviated from only by agreement, which shall be negotiated in detail, even if it is made for a number of similar contracts between the same contracting parties. However, the carrier may not invoke a provision in the consignment bill which deviates from the provisions mentioned in sentence 1 to the detriment of the party entitled under the consignment bill against a consignee named in the consignment bill to whom the consignment bill has been issued or against a third party to whom the consignment bill has been transferred.

(2) By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the compensation payable by the carrier for loss of or damage to the goods may also be limited by pre-formulated contractual terms to an amount other than that provided for in section 431 paragraphs 1 and 2 if this amount is

1.is between 2 and 40 units of account and the user of the pre-formulated contractual terms points out to his contractual partner in an appropriate manner that they provide for an amount other than the amount provided for by law, or
2.is less favorable to the user of the pre-formulated contractual terms than the amount provided for in Section 431 (1) and (2).

Furthermore, by way of derogation from paragraph 1, the amount of compensation to be paid by the sender under section 414 may be limited by pre-formulated contractual terms.

(3) If the sender is a consumer, no derogation from the provisions set out in paragraph 1 sentence 1 may be made to his detriment, unless the contract of carriage relates to the carriage of letters or similar items.

(4) If the contract of carriage is governed by foreign law, paragraphs 1 to 3 shall nevertheless apply if, according to the contract, both the place of taking over and the place of delivery of the goods are in Germany.

Excerpt from the explanatory memorandum (BT-Drucksache 13/8445):

“In many cases, the liability rules provided for in the present draft do not do justice to the special features of mass postal traffic: the majority of letters to be transported and some of the letter-like items (such as small parcels) are delivered via letterboxes without direct customer contact. The sender is often unknown. The value of the goods and the liability risk for these products can hardly be estimated. The carrier must be able to modify the liability – and not just the amount of liability – through general terms and conditions.”

The question

Does the liability privilege under Section 449 HGB for “letters and letter-like items” also apply to registered mail?

The answer must be “no” if you read the explanatory memorandum to the government draft of the TRG (BT-Drucksache 13/8445, see above). This is because the legislator has made it clear in the explanatory memorandum that the decisive criterion for distinguishing letters and letter-like items from other transport goods is the complete lack of customer contact (anonymity). This anonymity means that the value of the goods and the liability risk simply cannot be assessed by Swiss Post.

In my opinion, the aforementioned legislative intention only allows the conclusion that a registered letter is not a letter or a letter-like consignment within the meaning of § 449 HGB (also e.g.: Koller, Kommentar zum Transportrecht, 5th edition, § 449, para. 30; Grimme in Transportrecht 2004, 161).

The latter is less important because the Post would otherwise be able to exclude or at least limit its liability for registered mail even in cases of qualified fault via its general terms and conditions via Section 449 (2) HGB. This is because Swiss Post has – no doubt surprisingly for some – expressly assumed liability for qualified fault in its General Terms and Conditions. Section 6 (1) of the General Terms and Conditions “Letter National” reads as follows:

“Deutsche Post shall be liable for damages that are attributable to an act or omission that it, one of its employees or another vicarious agent (§ 428 HGB) has committed intentionally or recklessly and in the knowledge that damage will probably occur, regardless of the following limitations of liability.”

The rather interesting question, which the Federal Court of Justice and the Bonn District Court also had to ask themselves in their decisions explained below, is therefore whether the postal service can be subject to a so-called duty of disclosure in the case of registered mail.
I n general freight law, it is recognized that in cases in which the presumed area of the occurrence of damage is beyond the sender’s control, the carrier has a procedural duty to provide information, especially if the course of the damage is completely in the dark (see Koller, Transportrechtskommentar, 5th edition, § 435, para. 21).

If this obligation to comply is not fulfilled, the carrier is presumed to be at fault with the consequence of unlimited liability.

BGH judgment of June 14, 2006 (Ref. I ZR 136/03), NJW-RR 2007, 96-98

The BGH has now expressly denied such an obligation to comply, which indisputably cannot apply to ordinary letters, for registered letters as well. In justifying its decision, the court took up the legislator’s intention to give privileged treatment to the transportation of letters. The BGH stated:

“When transporting letters, the focus is on the transmission of the individual declaration of ideas contained in the letter. When sending parcels, the focus is on the transportation of the packaged valuable items. The sender of a letter generally suffers no material damage from its loss (see BGHZ 149, 337, 349). Accordingly, there is generally no incentive for third parties to appropriate the contents of letters in order to enrich themselves.

The fact that the due diligence and organizational requirements for the dispatch of letters and letter-like items are lower than for the transport of parcels is in line with the system of the law, which in Section 449 (2) sentence 1 HGB allows for more extensive limitations of liability for letters and letter-like items than for other items.”

The Federal Court of Justice has now applied the above finding, which can in any case be described as undisputed for ordinary letters, to registered letters. It stated the reasons for this:

“The registered letter differs from an ordinary item only to the extent that the posting and receipt of the item are documented. It is also subject to the rules of mass mail transport at favorable prices, which are based on what is economically justifiable. Registered letters are not intended for sending valuable goods. The special features of mass postal traffic – fast and inexpensive transmission to every household in Germany – apply to a registered letter in the same way as to ordinary letters and letter-like items.”

The weaknesses of the BGH ruling

The BGH’s reasoning is not convincing.

In line with the legislative intent, the Federal Court of Justice correctly stated that registered mail does not conceptually constitute “letters or letter-like items”. However, its reasoning as to why they should be treated as such does not hold water.

The BGH ignores the fact that the legislator has based the liability privilege for letters very decisively on the anonymity of sending letters (cf. the explanatory memorandum to the law, II. 2. above). However, this anonymity is lacking in the case of registered mail.

Furthermore, his argument that “the special features of mass postal traffic – fast and inexpensive transmission to every household in Germany” apply to registered mail just as much as to ordinary letters is not convincing.

First of all, registered mail accounts for only a fraction of the volume of letters sent by Swiss Post. Moreover, the fee that Swiss Post charges for registered mail is often many times higher than the postage of a normal letter. Against this background, registered mail cannot be regarded as part of the “bulk business”, the management of which is – allegedly – only possible by completely dispensing with interface controls.

Incidentally, the economic reality is that “the special features of postal mass transport” also apply to mass parcel services (DHL, UPS, etc.) today. It is not uncommon for the parcel rates charged by bulk parcel service providers to be barely higher than the postal rates for registered large letters. Nevertheless, the bulk parcel service providers must also live with their liability; especially in the event of loss, they must be able to admit to the circumstances of the loss if they want to avoid liability.

Finally, the BGH closes its eyes to the economic reality when it states: “Registered mail is not intended for the dispatch of valuable goods.”

Even in the case of normal letter mail, it is extremely questionable whether it can be assumed that the sender generally has no interest in the value of the item, with the result that in the event of loss he will also have no interest in recovering his item. With “maxi letters” in particular, the opposite is more likely to be the rule. Hardly any maxi letters will only contain “declarations of intent”. It should also be borne in mind that these days, declarations of intent are increasingly reaching their recipients electronically (especially by email), so it is questionable whether even normal letters (up to 20 g) always contain declarations of intent.

However, in the case of registered mail, it cannot be assumed that the recipient has no interest in the value of the item sent by registered mail. The case where the sender is only interested in a confirmation of receipt for a registered letter is likely to account for only a fraction of all registered letters. However, it is much more common for registered mail to be used as a “small parcel”, i.e. to send small consignments of goods.

Contra BGH: Judgment of the Bonn Local Court of 29.03.2006 (Ref. 9 C 549/05), n.v.)

In view of the above, the Bonn Local Court quite rightly assumed that there was an obligation to comply with a lost registered letter – or more precisely, its contents. Since Swiss Post was unable to exonerate itself, it was liable without limitation. Regrettably, Swiss Post was able to prevent the local court from providing reasons for its decision by recognizing the claim in dispute in good time. However, this is no obstacle for the author, who was involved in the proceedings on the side of the claimant, to present the correct reasons of the Local Court in the following:

The facts of the decision can be summarized as follows:

A car key was sent to the post office by registered mail, but never reached the recipient. A damage report resulted in Swiss Post returning the empty, torn envelope of the registered letter to the sender, but otherwise refusing any liability in excess of EUR 20 on the grounds that a higher liability was not provided for under its General Terms and Conditions, which were in accordance with the statutory provisions of the German Commercial Code.

During the trial, Swiss Post did not or could not explain how it was possible that the contents of the shipment were lost. As a result, the district court had to decide whether or not to subject the shipment in dispute to the liability privilege of Section 449 HGB.

In line with the view expressed by the BGH, the main argument of the Post against a duty to comply was as follows:
The transport of letters is a bulk business whose legal requirements according to the Postal Universal Service Ordinance (PUDLV), in particular the duration of transport, could not be fulfilled by the Post if it were obliged to carry out interface controls. However, if Swiss Post is not required to carry out interface checks, it cannot necessarily be required to explain the circumstances of the loss in the event of a loss.

Fortunately, the Bonn District Court has resisted the powerful postal-friendly case law of the Federal Court of Justice, which has rejected the arguments in favor of the Post (see V. above), and in the case described above required the Post to explain the circumstances of the loss:
The envelope of the registered letter was found torn open in an envelope center. The local court has now rightly demanded that the post office must explain itself and has thus imposed the described duty of disclosure on the post office. Swiss Post did not comply. Sensing the consequences, the Post then acknowledged the claim.

Conclusion

Swiss Post is free to expressly agree to exclude the carriage of goods items in its conditions of carriage for registered mail. However, as long as Swiss Post has not done so, the argumentation of the BGH is not convincing in view of the economic reality. The case law of the BGH cannot escape the impression that it was overly favorable to the interests of the Post as a former state-owned company. In contrast, the courts of first instance (such as the Bonn Local Court) appear to have acted with more impunity.

It should be noted that nowadays it is hardly justifiable to treat registered mail and ordinary mail in the same way in terms of liability. In particular, it is not valid to refer to the special features of mass postal traffic. The latter have long since also applied to bulk parcel shipments, which are handled on terms similar to those for large letters within one day and are nevertheless not subject to any liability privileges.

Man delivering the letter


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On the bias of judges in civil proceedings: If judges do not read a party’s pleadings, this can justify a motion for recusal!

Following on from my overview article on the application for recusal pursuant to Section 42 ZPO, I would like to report on an interesting ruling by the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe. According to this ruling, a judge’s failure to read the pleadings submitted by a party can give rise to concerns of bias. In the case in question, a judge had overlooked an application for recusal directed against him, as he had forwarded the pleading containing it unread to the opposing party for comment. This violates the so-called duty to wait pursuant to Section 47 (1) ZPO, according to which only “official acts that cannot be postponed” are permitted from the filing of an application for recusal until it has been dealt with.


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BGH on the legal consequences of thwarting evidence

In legal disputes, it often happens that one party makes it difficult for the opposing party to provide evidence. In these cases, the question then arises as to whether and, if so, with what legal consequences it can be assumed that evidence has been obstructed.


Read more "


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Guide: Judge biased? The application for bias according to § 42 ZPO

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Guide: Judge biased? The application for bias according to § 42 ZPO

Anyone who has ever been forced to seek legal assistance to enforce or defend against claims knows that being right and getting right are different things. It is not uncommon, and this experience is (unfortunately) also familiar to many of those affected, for the court proceedings to be accompanied by the impression that the judge responsible for the decision was not neutral and therefore possibly biased. If this partiality is to one’s own detriment, the question arises as to whether there are options for action in such cases. The following remarks deal with this question.

Judge gavel with Justice lawyers

1. neutrality of the court is an essential principle of the rule of law

In our constitutional state, the neutrality of the court is – of course – an extremely valuable asset. Our Basic Law therefore stipulates this in Article 97(1):

Judges are independent and subject only to the law.

The aforementioned provision is closely linked to another provision of our Basic Law, namely Article 101 (1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law:

No one may be deprived of their legal judge.

The wording of the provision quoted above may be difficult for the legal layperson to understand. It concerns a very important principle for guaranteeing the neutrality of the court: When Article 101 Paragraph 1 Sentence 2 of the Basic Law states that everyone has the right to their own statutory judge, this is intended to exclude human influence on the question of which judge will ultimately hear a legal case. In practice, this is guaranteed by predetermined objective criteria that decide which case ends up with which court/judge. The Federal Constitutional Court has defined the following standards (decision of February 8, 1967 – 2 BvR 235/64):

It follows from this meaning of Article 101.1 of the Basic Law that general rules must exist by virtue of the constitution as to which court, which panel and which judge are appointed to decide the individual case. The authority of the judge to decide in the specific case must be derived as clearly as possible from general provisions, namely from the rules of jurisdiction of the procedural laws and the schedule of responsibilities of the competent court (BVerfGE 17, 294 [298 f.] = NJW 64, 1020; BVerfGE 18, 344 [351 f.] = NJW 65, 1219).

2. guaranteeing neutrality in individual cases

The above-mentioned constitutional regulations alone cannot guarantee that the judge responsible for the decision is actually neutral in individual cases. In addition, the Federal Constitutional Court determined in the decision cited above that judicial neutrality

(…) it is essential “that it is exercised by a non-involved third party” (BVerfGE 3, 377 [381] = NJW 54, 833; BVerfGE 4, 331 [346] = NJW 56, 137; BVerfGE 14, 56 [69] = NJW 62, 1611; BVerfGE 18, 241 [255] = NJW65, 343).

The Federal Constitutional Court explained:

Judicial activity therefore requires neutrality and distance on the part of the judge vis-à-vis the parties to the proceedings. However, this does not only result in the requirement that – as the BVerfG in the decisions cited

has ruled – too close a personal connection between the courts and the bodies whose applications and files they have to rule on is unconstitutional. According to this principle, it must also be ensured that the person seeking justice does not stand before a judge who – for example due to close kinship, friendship or even

The fact that the company is at enmity with a party – lacks the necessary neutrality and distance.

3. the grounds for bias as the basis for an application for bias

According to the principles of the Federal Constitutional Court cited above “it must also be ensured that the person seeking justice does not stand before a judge who – for example because of close kinship, friendship or even friendship or even enmity with a party – lacks the necessary neutrality and distance.”

Section 42 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) is intended to provide the following legal protection to ensure the above:

(1) A judge may be recused both in cases in which he or she is excluded by law from exercising the office of judge and on grounds of apprehension of partiality.

(2) A challenge on grounds of apprehension of bias shall be made if there is a reason to justify mistrust of the impartiality of a judge.

(3) Both parties are entitled to the right of refusal in any case.

3.1 Starting point: The statutory grounds for exclusion pursuant to Section 41 ZPO

Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) standardizes certain circumstances in which a judge is already considered biased by law, namely:

“1. in matters in which he himself is a party or in which he is in the relationship of a co-authorized party, co-obligated party or party with a right of recourse to a party;

2. in matters relating to his or her spouse, even if the marriage no longer exists;

2a. in matters relating to his or her partner, even if the partnership no longer exists;

3. in the case of a person to whom he is or was related by blood or marriage in the direct line, in the collateral line up to the third degree or related by marriage up to the second degree;

4. in matters in which he is or was appointed as an authorized representative or counsel for a party or is or was entitled to act as the legal representative of a party;

5. in matters in which he is questioned as a witness or expert;

6. in matters in which he has participated in the issuance of the contested decision in a previous appeal or in arbitration proceedings, unless it concerns the activity of a delegated or requested judge;

7. in cases due to overlong court proceedings, if he has participated in the proceedings complained of in a legal process, on the duration of which the claim for compensation is based;

8. in matters in which he has participated in mediation proceedings or other out-of-court dispute resolution proceedings.”

3.2 The reason for refusal “Concern of bias”

The “apprehension of bias” completes, so to speak, the aforementioned statutory grounds for bias.

From the wording of the law (Section 42 (2) ZPO: (…) if a reason exists which is capable of justifying mistrust of the impartiality of a judge.) , it follows that this reason for bias does not require that a judge is actually biased. It is sufficient if “objective reasons” justify the assumption that a judge is biased.

In other words:

Objectively justified mistrust leads to concerns about bias.

With regard to the objective circumstances required to justify distrust of a judge, the grounds for disqualification under Section 41 ZPO (see above) can be helpful. The closer a situation is to one of the grounds for disqualification, the closer it is to the assumption that there is a justified concern regarding the bias of a judge. Here is an example:

According to § 41 No. 2/2a, a judge is excluded in matters concerning his or her spouse or partner. If the matter concerns a person with whom the judge has lived in a domestic partnership for many years, e.g. in the context of a shared flat during their studies, it should be possible to justify concerns of bias with reference to the proximity to this very section 41 no. 2/2a ZPO.

In cases in which Section 41 ZPO cannot be applied, it becomes more difficult:

According to the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG NJW 2000, 2808), the rule of thumb is:

Concerns of bias on the part of a judge (…) presuppose that there is a reason that is capable of justifying doubts about the judge’s impartiality. It does not matter whether the judge is actually biased or prejudiced or whether he considers himself to be biased. The only decisive factor is whether, on a reasonable assessment of all the circumstances, there is reason to doubt the impartiality of the judge.

In connection with the above-mentioned rule of thumb, the following groups of cases based on the conduct of the judge typically provide grounds for concern about bias:

  • The manner in which the proceedings are conducted can give rise to bias, particularly if it suggests that one party is being arbitrarily disadvantaged or favored. Examples of this are the unwillingness to take note of oral or written party submissions, an obviously excessive advance on costs for an expert witness, inappropriate pressure to settle, the rejection of a justified request for transfer by the party without or with an unobjective justification (OLG Cologne NJW-RR 97, 823; OLG Munich NJW-RR 02, 862), prolonged inactivity of the judge or undue delay in proceedings without objective reason (OLG Brandenburg FamRZ 01, 552; BauR 12, 1150; OLGR Frankfurt 09, 115; doubtful, aA OLG Hamm Beschl v 4.1.11 – 1 W 86/10; LSG NRW decision of 19.10.11 – L 11 SF 297/11 AB).
  • Assistance to a partyAssistance to a party which, for example, recommends a new cause of action, advises a cross-appeal, points out the way of assignment in order to avoid problems of standing to sue, or suggests the “escape into default” in order to avoid disadvantages from missing the deadlines set by the judge himself, gives rise to concerns of bias.The same applies to a reference to possible defenses or counterclaims, in particular the statute of limitations defense (BGH NJW 2004, 164).
  • UnobjectivityUnobjective behavior is always likely to indicate bias, because such behavior can never be practically justified by procedural tasks. Examples are insulting statements or “showing the bird”.

3.3 No reason for bias: Judicial references (!)

As a rule, judicial references pursuant to Section 139 ZPO do not constitute grounds for bias.

The reform of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) has significantly strengthened the court’s duty to provide information, advice and care. Since then, the law has expressly obliged the court to conduct a legal discussion. Accordingly, expressions of legal opinion are not a suitable starting point, e.g. if the judge (provisionally) comments on the prospects of success of the action as part of the introduction to the state of the case and dispute or in settlement discussions. Therefore, for example, the judge’s suggestion to withdraw the action or the appeal lodged due to a lack of prospects of success cannot constitute bias. The limit is the transition to genuine assistance (see above), which is why, outside of settlement negotiations, references to legal positions for which there are no references in the party’s statement of claim are not covered by the substantive conduct of proceedings (duty to provide information) of Section 139 ZPO

4. the procedure if there are doubts about the neutrality of the judge

In summary, an application for recusal proceeds as follows:

4.1 Application for rejection

If a party is of the opinion that a judge involved in the proceedings is biased in the aforementioned sense, the party must submit a corresponding recusal request to the court appointed to make the decision, which will then decide on the request without the judge concerned (Section 44 ZPO).

The application for recusal is generally form-free, i.e. it can also be submitted orally by means of a statement for the record. In terms of time, it is generally admissible from the pendency until the judgment becomes final. However, Section 43 ZPO does in fact impose a clear restriction:

43 ZPO

A party can no longer object to a judge on the grounds of apprehension of bias if it has entered a hearing or submitted motions to the judge without asserting the reason for objection known to it.

As a result, this means that an application for recusal must be made immediately after becoming aware of a reason for recusal, because the law interprets any further “admission” by the party concerned in the course of the ongoing proceedings as acceptance of the circumstance giving rise to bias.

The application for recusal submitted in an admissible form is justified if there is a reason for exclusion (Section 41 ZPO) or concern about bias (Section 42 ZPO).

4.2 Credibility of the grounds for refusal

The grounds for recusal must be substantiated. The official statement of the rejected judge and the affidavit of the legal representative of the rejecting party serve as a means of establishing credibility.

If a request for recusal is only made in the course of proceedings, it must be substantiated that the reason for recusal or knowledge thereof only arose later, in addition to the reason for recusal.

The procedure for deciding on a recusal request is governed by Section 45 ZPO. According to this, the decision on the recusal request is made by the court to which the recused judge belongs, but without the participation of the judge. He is replaced by his representative as specified in the schedule of responsibilities.

If a judge at the local court is rejected, another judge of the local court – designated for this purpose in the schedule of responsibilities – shall decide.

4.3 Decision on the rejection request and appeal

Pursuant to Section 46 ZPO, the decision is made by means of an order against which an immediate appeal may be lodged if the application for recusal is declared inadmissible or unfounded. An appeal against decisions of the OLG and LG in appeal and complaint proceedings is only possible if it is permitted.


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LATEST ARTICLES

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On the bias of judges in civil proceedings: If judges do not read a party’s pleadings, this can justify a motion for recusal!

Following on from my overview article on the application for recusal pursuant to Section 42 ZPO, I would like to report on an interesting ruling by the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe. According to this ruling, a judge’s failure to read the pleadings submitted by a party can give rise to concerns of bias. In the case in question, a judge had overlooked an application for recusal directed against him, as he had forwarded the pleading containing it unread to the opposing party for comment. This violates the so-called duty to wait pursuant to Section 47 (1) ZPO, according to which only “official acts that cannot be postponed” are permitted from the filing of an application for recusal until it has been dealt with.


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