Entries by Daniel Meier-Greve

Reference to USB stick in the application

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News on digitization IN civil proceedings - reference to USB stick in the application ADmissible

The reference to a USB stick in the claim is permissible. This was clarified by the Federal Court of Justice in a recent ruling from 14.07.2022 (Ref. I ZR 97/21).

Problem description: Digitization in civil proceedings

Digitalization is advancing – also in civil proceedings. According to the law (see Section 130a (1) ZPO), attachments to statements of claim or other pleadings may be submitted to the court as “electronic documents” subject to certain requirements. § Section 130a (1) ZPO reads:

“Preparatory pleadings and their annexes, applications and declarations to be submitted in writing by the parties as well as information, statements, expert opinions, translations and declarations by third parties to be submitted in writing may be submitted to the court as electronic documents in accordance with the following paragraphs.”

The problem is that the permission cited above is limited to the digital submission of objects that also exist or can be produced in written form. In reality, however, we are increasingly dealing with purely digital objects or facts. For this increasingly common constellation, the BGH has now provided valuable clarification for practical use.

Woman plugging a USB flash drive into her laptop

The BGH ruling of 14.07.2022 (Case No. I ZR 97/21) – The digitalization of civil proceedings also includes the reference to a USB stick in the application for action

In its judgment of 14.07.2022 (case no. I ZR 97/21), the Federal Court of Justice clarified that reference to a USB stick is also permitted in a claim that is to be enforced in the event of success. The BGH stated:

“The specificity of the application must also be examined ex officio in appeal proceedings by
(BGH, judgment of 16.
December 2021 – I ZR 201/20,
GRUR 2022, 229 [juris para. 21] = WRP 2022, 318 – ÖKO-TEST III, mwN).
According to
Section 253 (2) no. 2 ZPO, an application for an injunction – and according to Section 313 (1)
no. 4 ZPO a conviction based on it – must not be worded so vaguely that the subject matter of the dispute and the scope of the court’s power of review and decision (Section 308 (1) ZPO) are not clearly delineated, the defendant is therefore unable to defend itself exhaustively and the decision as to what it is prohibited from doing is ultimately left to the enforcement court (st.
case law; see BGH, judgment of September 9, 2021 – I ZR 90/20, BGHZ 231, 38 [juris para. 19] – Influencer I, mwN). Sufficient certainty is usually given if reference is made to the specific infringing act and the claim, at least by referring to the claim, unambiguously indicates the characteristics of the challenged conduct in which the basis and the connecting factor for the infringement of competition and thus the injunction should lie (cf. BGH, judgment of November 8, 2018 – I ZR 108/17, GRUR 2019, 627 [juris para. 15]=WRP2019,731 – Deutschland-Kombi; decision of February 4, 2021 – I ZR79/20,K&R 2021, 333 [juris,para.12]).

Accordingly, the Court of Appeal correctly assumed that
the reference to the USB stick submitted by the plaintiff as Annex K 1 to the files , which indisputably fully documents the telemedia offer complained of as a specific form of infringement, is sufficient to substantiate the plaintiff’s applications for injunctive relief.”


My assessment of the admissibility of the reference to a USB stick in the application

The ruling makes it clear in a welcome way that the digitization of civil proceedings does not stop at the submission of documents in the context of court proceedings.
§ Section 130a (1) ZPO does not help if the actual subject matter of the dispute in the proceedings is a digital product. In this case, it is simply not possible to dispense with a reference to a digital source outside the judgment (here: USB stick) in a judgment.

Plenty of space on this one. An african-american woman showing you a USB stick.

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International procedural law


Enforcement of international jurisdiction agreements: What to do in the event of an action from abroad despite an exclusive jurisdiction agreement to the contrary?

In order to avoid costly and unpleasant legal disputes abroad, it is advisable to conclude exclusive jurisdiction agreements with foreign business partners which stipulate that only German courts have jurisdiction. However, it is not uncommon for the business partner to file a lawsuit in their own country in the event of a dispute, contrary to the jurisdiction agreement. In such cases, the question arises: What can be done to enforce international choice of court agreements?


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Action dismissed as “currently unfounded”

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Building law guide:

On the legal force of a dismissal of an action as "currently unfounded"

Especially in construction law disputes, it is not uncommon for a claim to be dismissed as “currently unfounded”. This often concerns the due date of remuneration claims, for example, because acceptance as a prerequisite for the due date is questionable. In these cases, there are often judgments that dismiss a claim as currently unfounded.

The BGH recently stated in detail that in such cases the res judicata effect of the dismissing judgment also includes the grounds for the judgment, insofar as the other – i.e. the currently not missing – claim requirements have been positively established or affirmed.

Close up of a lot of law reports in library

BGH on the res judicata effect of a dismissal of an action as currently unfounded

In its ruling of December 9, 2022 (case no. V ZR 72/21), the BGH stated the reasons for this:

“(…)

It has been clarified in supreme court case law that if an action for payment is dismissed as currently unfounded pursuant to Section 322 (1) ZPO, the fact that the plaintiff had no claim due for payment against the defendant up to the time of the last oral hearing becomes res judicata (cf. Senate, judgment of October 6, 1989 – V ZR 263/86, WM 1989, 1897, 1898; BGH, judgment of July 28, 2011 – VII ZR 180/10, NJW-RR 2011, 1528 para. 12; decision of January 23, 2014 – VII ZB 49/13, NJW 2014, 1306 para. 11).

(…)

The extent to which a dismissal of an action as currently unfounded can also have a “positive” res judicata effect in addition to this “negative” res judicata effect to the detriment of the plaintiff, to the effect that the existence of certain conditions of the claim is established in favor of the plaintiff, has been disputed to date.

(…)

This question was answered in the affirmative by the Third Civil Senate in a decision handed down after the judgment of the Court of Appeal in a case in which an official liability claim against a notary (Section 19 (1) sentence 1 BNotO) had been comprehensively examined in preliminary proceedings and then dismissed solely due to the existence of another possibility of compensation (see judgment of June 9, 2022 – III ZR 24/21, NJW 2022, 2754 marginal no. 17 et seq. with extensive evidence on the status of the dispute ). Accordingly, the res judicata effect of a judgment dismissing the claim as currently unfounded also extends to the fact that the conditions of the claim are otherwise fulfilled if and to the extent that these have been affirmed or positively established in the grounds of the decision. In order to determine the scope of res judicata, the facts of the case and the reasons for the decision must be used in addition in the case of judgments dismissing the action.

(…)

The V. Civil Senate agrees with the convincing argumentation of the III. Civil Senate and also considers it relevant in this constellation.

However, the entire content of the judgment does not become res judicata. Rather, res judicata is limited to the legal consequence that forms the sentence of the decision, which the court has derived from the facts of the case by subsuming them under objective law. However, in the case of a decision dismissing an action, the decisive reason for the dismissal, which is to be determined from the grounds and determines the legal consequence, is part of the final judgment and not solely an element of the grounds for the judgment.

(…)

If the court in the preliminary proceedings, in which the defendant applies for the unlimited dismissal of the action, affirms the conditions of the asserted claim with the exception of the occurrence of conditions precedent, the affirmation of the conditions of the claim is not merely an element of the grounds for the judgment and a preliminary question, but, measured against the defendant’s legal protection objective, a decisive reason for dismissal. The defendant, who is seeking an unlimited dismissal of the action, is adversely affected due to his further legal protection objective, insofar as (only) a dismissal as currently unfounded is made.

(…)

He can therefore – at least by means of an appeal – obtain a judicial review of the extent to which the asserted claim should be rejected without restriction because it does not ultimately exist.

(…)

However, it is then logical that the affirmation of the conditions for entitlement has a “positive” effect in favor of the plaintiff. This result is also convincing because otherwise, in subsequent proceedings, the plaintiff might be forced to prove the already examined and affirmed conditions of entitlement again. The defendant could therefore, by contesting the claim again, ensure that a comprehensive examination of the same claim prerequisites takes place both in the preliminary proceedings and in the subsequent proceedings. Such a result would be nonsensical from a procedural point of view because it would devalue the results of the previous proceedings…”


Assessment of this view on the dismissal of the action as “currently unfounded”

The ruling is to be welcomed in principle, as it would indeed be nonsensical to have to re-examine previously examined and affirmed eligibility requirements in subsequent proceedings.

However, caution is advised for those affected by such constellations insofar as this case law also harbors pitfalls – at least if the principles listed are extended to every conceivable case of a claim being dismissed as “currently unfounded” due to the absence of an individual claim requirement. An example of this is the case in which the plaintiff appeals against such a judgment with the aim that the court of appeal also affirms the missing requirement for a claim and thus upholds the action. Strictly speaking, the appellate court’s review jurisdiction would then be limited to the question of the existence of this individual due date requirement. The other conditions of entitlement affirmed by the court of first instance do not constitute a complaint by the plaintiff filing the appeal. In order for the court of appeal (in favor of the defendant of the first instance) to also review the other conditions of entitlement, the defendant would have to file a cross-appeal.

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International procedural law


Enforcement of international jurisdiction agreements: What to do in the event of an action from abroad despite an exclusive jurisdiction agreement to the contrary?

In order to avoid costly and unpleasant legal disputes abroad, it is advisable to conclude exclusive jurisdiction agreements with foreign business partners which stipulate that only German courts have jurisdiction. However, it is not uncommon for the business partner to file a lawsuit in their own country in the event of a dispute, contrary to the jurisdiction agreement. In such cases, the question arises: What can be done to enforce international choice of court agreements?


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Guide to International Civil Procedure: Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Germany

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Guide to International Civil Procedure:
Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Germany

We would like to inform you whether and how a foreign judgment given outside the EU can be enforced in Germany.

Description of the problem

Once a judgment has been successfully obtained against a German debtor abroad (in a third country), the creditor is faced with the important practical question of how to actually get his money.

If the German debtor does not pay voluntarily, only the enforcement of the judgment will help. However, since in most cases the German debtor only has assets in Germany that could be enforced, the foreign judgment must be enforced in Germany. This requires that the foreign judgment has first been declared enforceable by a German court. This declaration of enforceability is the subject of separate court proceedings against the debtor in Germany, at the end of which, if successful, an enforcement order will be issued.

The following article deals with the content of these proceedings.

collection of various flags of different countries standing tall together in a row on a stand

Starting point: Necessity of a Recognition Procedure under Section 722 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung/ZPO).

Unless special agreements under international law provide otherwise, a foreign judgment is initially of no value in Germany. Rather, only a successfully obtained enforcement judgment (cf. section 723 ZPO) leads to the enforceability of the foreign judgment in Germany as well.

A foreign creditor wishing to enforce a foreign judgment against a German debtor in Germany must therefore first apply to the competent German court for the foreign judgment to be declared enforceable. This is standardized in Section 722(1) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO):

“(1) Compulsory enforcement may be pursued under the judgment of a foreign court if such compulsory enforcement is ruled admissible by a judgment for enforcement.”

The object of this enforcement procedure under Section 722(1) of the ZPO is no longer the facts of the case already decided by the foreign court, but only the examination of whether the conditions for recognition set out in Section 328 of the ZPO are fulfilled.

If the German court comes to the conclusion that the foreign proceedings meet these requirements and that the decision was therefore formally justified, enforcement of the foreign judgment is also permitted for the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. Enforcement is then carried out solely on the basis of the German enforcement order, which in fact merely reproduces the decision of the foreign court.

Grounds for refusal to be examined by the German court

As mentioned above, the enforceability of a foreign judgment in Germany requires that it be recognized in Germany. The enforceability of a foreign judgment is reviewed ex officio by the German court in the enforcement proceedings referred to above under Sections 722 and 723 ZPO.

In the absence of a relevant bilateral agreement between Germany and the plaintiff state, the general rules of international law apply to recognisability. In this general case, recognability is to be measured against section 328(1) of the ZPO:

“(1) Recognition of a judgment handed down by a foreign court shall be ruled out if:

  1. The courts of the state to which the foreign court belongs do not have jurisdiction according to German law;

  2. The defendant, who has not entered an appearance in the proceedings and who takes recourse to this fact, has not duly been served the document by which the proceedings were initiated, or not in such time to allow him to defend himself;

  3. The judgment is incompatible with a judgment delivered in Germany, or with an earlier judgment handed down abroad that is to be recognized, or if the proceedings on which such judgment is based are incompatible with proceedings that have become pending earlier in Germany;

  4. The recognition of the judgment would lead to a result that is obviously incompatible with essential principles of German law, and in particular if the recognition is not compatible with fundamental rights;

  5. Reciprocity has not been granted.”

Accordingly, recognition of a foreign judgment is to be refused in the following cases :

Lack of jurisdiction of the foreign court

The objection of lack of jurisdiction is always the most obvious argument against recognition. This is because the international principle is that, in case of doubt, an action must be brought at the defendant’s domicile or place of business. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the foreign court for an action against a German defendant would have to be based on a special place of jurisdiction or an effective agreement on jurisdiction.

No proper service / breach of the right to be heard

It is not uncommon to raise the objection that the foreign claim has not been properly served. This presupposes, for example, that the German defendant had sufficient opportunity to defend himself properly against the action. Since case law interprets this requirement very narrowly, this objection is usually only helpful in extreme cases, e.g. if there were only a few days between service on the German defendant and the date of the foreign judgment, which is likely to be rare.

In addition, a translation of the complaint into German is usually required. In most cases, this follows from the Hague Service Convention of 15 November 1965, to which a large majority of countries in addition to Germany have adhered.

Incompatibility with other judgments

The objection that the recognition of the foreign judgment is incompatible with a domestic, German court decision is also very relevant in practice and accordingly significant.

This is particularly relevant in the case of an earlier lis pendens of domestic proceedings with the same subject-matter. “Lis pendens” is the point in time at which a validly filed claim has been validly received by the defendant. The time of lis pendens abroad is determined by the foreign law. It is irrelevant whether the foreign court was aware of the domestic proceedings.

Please also read my separate article on this constellation “The negative declaratory action to prevent a foreign action”.

By the way:

The priority of the domestic judgment applies even if the domestic judgment was issued despite the earlier pendency of the foreign proceedings. Domestic judgments therefore always block, even if they should not have been issued at all.

Incompatibility with the so-called ordre public

Finally, the so-called ordre public must be observed. This concerns the compatibility of the foreign judgment in question with the essential principles of German law.

If a foreign judgment is so contrary to the fundamental principles of German law that it would be almost intolerable to declare such a judgment enforceable in Germany, it must be refused recognition.

The above applies above all to violations of fundamental rights (In German: “Grundrechte”). Other examples of judgments that violate German ordre public are those that are based on procedural fraud or judgments whose subject matter is gambling or betting debts.

Lack of guarantee of so-called reciprocity (In German: “Verbürgung der Gegenseitigkeit”)

A mandatory requirement for recognition is also the so-called “guarantee of reciprocity” in relation to the sentencing state in question.

“Reciprocity” means that the recognition and enforcement of a German judgment in the foreign state in question should not encounter significantly greater difficulties than, conversely, the recognition and enforcement of a comparable foreign judgment in Germany. In short: The point is that the “rules of the game” must be reasonably consistent among themselves. It is unacceptable for Germany to recognise a judgment from a country which, on the other hand, refuses to recognize German judgments or only recognizes them under considerably more difficult conditions.

Notice:

The above definition leads to the following problem: The question of so-called reciprocity can only be answered by looking at the actual judicial practice of both countries. This practice is in a constant state of flux, so the question must be examined on a case-by-case basis.

The above-mentioned requirements for the recognition of foreign judgments already have an impact on the German defendant’s decision as to whether he should defend against the foreign action at all.

In principle, the German defendant is free to decide whether to take up the “defense at a distance” – accepting (perhaps) unnecessary and thereby high costs.

For the German defendant, however, it is important to note that objections to the merits of the claim must generally be raised in the main action, i.e. in the foreign proceedings. However, according to the case law of the German Federal Supreme Court (BGH), this does not apply without exceptions. In particular, it is still possible to raise the defense of procedural fraud in the recognition proceedings. In its judgment of 29.04.1999 (X ZR 263/97), the BGH stated that:

“In proceedings for a declaration of enforceability, supplementary factual submissions by the parties are admissible at any rate to the extent that a violation of section 328 (1) no. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to be inferred from the manner in which the judgment to be recognized was reached. (….)

In contrast, both section 328 (1) no. 2 and no. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure leave it up to the defendant domiciled in Germany to plead abroad at all. If he takes the risk of being sentenced abroad, he takes on the complication of only being allowed to assert narrowly limited defenses in the recognition proceedings. In any case, the plea of fraud is not cut off.”

According to the aforementioned judgment, the German debtor who did not defend himself against the foreign claim could still claim in the subsequent German recognition proceedings that

  • he was never properly served with the claim, and/or
  • the foreign judgment is incompatible with fundamental principles of German law.

Conclusion and Recommendation

The above summaries show that there are various obstacles to the recognition and thus the enforceability of foreign judgments in Germany. It follows that competent advice and, if necessary, representation are indispensable for foreign creditors.

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Enforcement of international jurisdiction agreements: What to do in the event of an action from abroad despite an exclusive jurisdiction agreement to the contrary?

In order to avoid costly and unpleasant legal disputes abroad, it is advisable to conclude exclusive jurisdiction agreements with foreign business partners which stipulate that only German courts have jurisdiction. However, it is not uncommon for the business partner to file a lawsuit in their own country in the event of a dispute, contrary to the jurisdiction agreement. In such cases, the question arises: What can be done to enforce international choice of court agreements?


Read more "


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Guide to appeal law – Importance of the content of the grounds of appeal for the scope of review by the court of appeal

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Guide to appeal law - Importance of the content of the grounds of appeal for the scope of review by the court of appeal

The view that the content of the grounds of appeal determines the scope of review by the court of appeal is widespread. According to this view, the grounds of appeal must contain all complaints regarding the first instance judgment that the appellant wishes to have reviewed by the court of appeal. If the appellant omits a complaint, this would mean that the court of appeal itself would have to ignore legal violations that it has recognized and deemed to be significant.

This surprisingly widespread view is wrong and – time and again – a reason for the BGH to put a stop to this attempt by many OLGs to get files off the table.

Entrance to the Royal Court of Justice

Clarifications by the BGH on the scope of review by the court of appeal

If an appeal meets the statutory requirements, for which it is sufficient that the grounds of appeal contain a single admissible complaint, then the entire substance of the proceedings at first instance will be subject to review by the court of appeal.

In its decision of 28.04.2020 (case no. VI ZR 347/19), the BGH – once again – cleared up this widespread misconception. The reason for this was a ruling by the Higher Regional Court of Munich, which had rejected an appeal that was actually well-founded (!) with the incorrect argument that the appellant had not named the well-founded complaint in question in his grounds of appeal. It was not possible to make up for this in a subsequent pleading. In its decision dated 28.04.2020 (case no. VI ZR 347/19), the BGH commented on this as follows and branded the opinion of the OLG as “manifestly erroneous“:

“(…)

The appeal against denial of leave to appeal is successful and leads to the annulment of the contested judgment and the referral of the legal dispute back to the court of appeal in accordance with Section 544 (9) ZPO. The contested judgment is based on a violation of the plaintiff’s right to a fair hearing under Article 103 (1) of the German Constitution.

  1. In support of its decision, the Court of Appeal stated, among other things, that there was no room for the hearing of witnesses Z. and G., who had been named in the first instance in the statement of October 29, 2014, as requested in the statement of March 26, 2019, in accordance with Section 520 (3) ZPO. This is because the regional court’s failure to hear the two witnesses was not objected to in the grounds of appeal. Thus, at this stage of the proceedings, there is no longer any room to make up for the evidence that was not taken at first instance.
  1. The complaint against denial of leave to appeal rightly asserts that the plaintiff’s constitutionally protected right to a fair hearing was violated by the rejection of his repeated request to hear the witnesses Z. and G. in the appeal instance – after expiry of the time limit for filing the grounds of appeal. The non-consideration of a significant offer of evidence violates Article 103 (1) of the Basic Law if it is not supported by procedural law (established case law, see only Senate decision of May 28, 2019 – VI ZR 328/18, VersR 2020, 317 para. 5 with further references). This is the case here because the opinion of the Court of Appeal that there is no room for the examination of witnesses pursuant to Section 520 (3) ZPO is manifestly erroneous (see Senate decision of September 24, 2019 – VI ZR 517/18, VersR 2020, 379 para.

    a) If the appeal is admissible, then according to the case law of the Federal Court of Justice, the entire procedural material of the first instance, which is evident from the files, is generally transferred to the appeal instance without further ado (BGH, judgments of March 12, 2004 – V ZR 257/03, BGHZ 158, 269, 278; of March 19, 2004 – V ZR 104/03, BGHZ 158, 295, 309; of September 27, 2006 – VIII ZR 19/04, NJW 2007, 2414 para. 16). Accordingly, submissions that were not rejected at first instance become part of the proceedings at second instance without further ado; in principle, there is no need for a new submission in this respect (Senate decision of September 24, 2019 – VI ZR 517/18, VersR 2020, 379 para. 8). The court of appeal must take into account all specific indications that cast doubt on the accuracy or completeness of the factual findings, which have their basis in the submissions of the parties at first instance, even if the appellant has not made the ignoring of this submission the subject of an appeal. If the court of appeal notices, for example when examining other complaints on appeal, that the court of first instance has ignored a fact that is important for the assessment of evidence or a significant offer of evidence, then even without a complaint to this effect, there are concrete indications of doubt as to the correctness of the findings that are relevant to the decision, which oblige the court of appeal pursuant to Section 529 Para. 1 no. 1 half-sentence 2 ZPO (Federal Court of Justice, judgment of March 12, 2004 – V ZR 257/03, BGHZ 158, 269, 279).

Nothing else results from the commentaries on Section 520 (3) ZPO cited in the appeal judgment (Reichold in Thomas/Putzo, ZPO, 39th edition, Section 520 para. 23; Heßler in Zöller, ZPO, 32nd edition, Section 520 para. 41). This is because Section 520 (3) sentence 2 ZPO and the commentaries on this only concern the content requirements to be placed on the grounds of appeal. However, if even one complaint meets these requirements, the appeal is admissible – in relation to one and the same matter in dispute. According to the aforementioned case law, the duty of the court of appeal to examine the case also extends to other specific indications of doubt as to the accuracy and completeness of the factual findings. (…).


Conclusion

In the interests of his clients, every lawyer is well advised to always have this case law of the Federal Court of Justice to hand if a Higher Regional Court – once again – attempts to “dismiss” an appeal on the grounds that the grounds of appeal were limited to a specific point of attack that did not apply in the specific case.

Please also read my contribution on the often unjustified rejection of party submissions by the courts of appeal!

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Enforcement of international jurisdiction agreements: What to do in the event of an action from abroad despite an exclusive jurisdiction agreement to the contrary?

In order to avoid costly and unpleasant legal disputes abroad, it is advisable to conclude exclusive jurisdiction agreements with foreign business partners which stipulate that only German courts have jurisdiction. However, it is not uncommon for the business partner to file a lawsuit in their own country in the event of a dispute, contrary to the jurisdiction agreement. In such cases, the question arises: What can be done to enforce international choice of court agreements?


Read more "


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Possibilities of contesting a settlement concluded in court

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Guide to procedural law:
Options for contesting a court settlement

Civil proceedings are often concluded by way of a settlement between the parties during the course of the proceedings. This is often done with the help of the court. Practice shows that such a settlement, despite the involvement of the court, is not without its pitfalls. I would like to provide an overview below:

Businessmen shaking hands

Overview of the types of court settlements

The Code of Civil Procedure provides for two ways of reaching a settlement with the help of the court:

  • On the one hand, a court settlement can be reached during the oral hearing. In this case, the settlement negotiated during the hearing is recorded by the court in the minutes of the hearing and must then be approved by the parties or their representatives. The approval must also be recorded in the minutes.
  • On the other hand, a court settlement can also be concluded by the parties submitting a written settlement proposal to the court or accepting a written settlement proposal from the court in writing to the court. The court then determines the conclusion and content of the settlement by means of an order.

Effect of the settlement agreement

The settlement effectively concluded in one of the aforementioned ways generally leads to the termination of the legal dispute.

In its ruling of 14.7.2015 (case no. VI ZR 326/14; NJW 2015, 2965), the BGH summarized the legal nature and effect of a court settlement:

“(…)

A court settlement has a dual legal nature. On the one hand, it is a procedural act that ends the legal dispute and whose effectiveness is determined according to procedural law principles. On the other hand, it is a private legal transaction to which the provisions of substantive law apply and with which the parties settle claims and liabilities (BGHZ 164, 190 [193 f.] = NJW 2005, 3576 mwN; cf. also BGHZ 142, 84 [88] = NJW 1999, 2806; BGHZ 79, 71 [74] = NJW 1981, 823; BGHZ 41, 310 [311] = NJW 1964, 1524; BGHZ 28, 171 [172] = NJW 1958, 1970; BGHZ 16, 388 [390] = NJW 1955, 705; OLG Hamm, NJW-RR 2012, 882). Procedural acts and private legal transactions are not separate. Rather, the procedural effects and the substantive legal agreements are interdependent (BGHZ 164, 190 [194] = NJW 2005, 3576; BGHZ 79, 71 = NJW 1981, 823). The court settlement is only effective if both the substantive legal requirements for a settlement and the procedural requirements for an effective court action are met. If one of these requirements is not met, there is no effective court settlement; the effect of ending the proceedings does not occur (BGHZ 164, 190 = NJW 2005, 3576; see also BGHZ 16, 388 = NJW 1955, 705). This also applies to the court settlement within the meaning of Section 278 VI ZPO (see BT-Drs. 14/4722, 82; BAGE 120, 251 = NJW 2007, 1831 para. 15; OLG Hamm, NJW-RR 2012, 882; Assmann in Wieczorek/Schütze, ZPO, 4th ed., Section 278 para. 79; Thomas/Putzo/Seiler, ZPO, 36th ed., Section 794 para. 2 f.).

(…)”

Dispute over the effectiveness of the settlement

In practice, it happens time and again that one party attempts to challenge the validity of the settlement reached.

The starting point here (see the BGH ruling cited above) is that the court settlement is of a dual nature, with the result that grounds for invalidity can arise on two levels. A distinction must therefore be made between two types of conceivable defects:

Level 1: Process-related defects

On the one hand, the court settlement is a litigation contract and could suffer from procedural defects.

The most frequent deficiency at this level is the incorrect logging of the contents of the comparison.

Level 2: Material defects

The court settlement is also a “normal” substantive legal contract between the parties with which they wish to end or settle their dispute.

This contract may also suffer from defects, e.g. in such a way that one of the parties was in error when making the declarations enabling the settlement. Under certain circumstances, this would enable it to contest the settlement on the grounds of error in accordance with Section 119 BGB. The case of Section 779 BGB (error regarding the basis of the settlement), which is expressly regulated by law, also comes into consideration. A right of adjustment may also arise from the point of view of interference with the basis of the transaction (Section 313 BGB)

Procedural consequences of a settlement challenge

If a party asserts defects in the settlement to the court, this leads to the continuation of the proceedings and the examination of the asserted defects by the court.

A distinction must then be made:

  • If the court finds procedural defects, this means that the court settlement is invalid. The legal dispute is still pending. A special situation arises in cases in which the parties had initially reached a substantively effective agreement and this agreement was subsequently incorrectly recorded in the minutes. This is because the merely erroneous recording does not eliminate the previously valid agreement.

    And even in other cases of a court settlement that is ineffective for procedural reasons, it may be contrary to good faith (Section 242 BGB) if a party invokes the procedural defect due to contradictory behavior. The BGH assumed this as follows in the judgment cited above:

    (…)
    However, in accordance with the principle of good faith (§ 242 BGB), the plaintiff cannot invoke the fact that the settlement determined by the appellate court pursuant to § 278 VI 2 ZPO was not valid in procedural terms.

    The principle of good faith also applies in procedural law (…).
    Contradictory behavior of a party (venire contra factum proprium) in the process can be an abuse of rights and therefore inadmissible (…).

    Contradictory conduct is an abuse of rights if a situation of trust has arisen for the other party or if special circumstances make the exercise of rights appear to be contrary to good faith (…). According to the established case law of the BGH, the exercise of rights may be inadmissible if, for example, the overall picture of contradictory conduct arises objectively because the earlier conduct is objectively incompatible with the later conduct and the interests of the other party appear to be primarily worthy of protection in view of this (…).

  • If the court finds material defects that result in the settlement being null and void (i.e. initially ineffective), the situation is as if the settlement had never existed.

    The proceedings continue as normal because the legal dispute was never actually concluded.

  • In cases in which the settlement was initially effective and is only called into question or has become ineffective ex nunc due to circumstances occurring later, e.g. due to a disruption of the basis of the transaction, the situation is more complex because the settlement initially had the effect of terminating the settlement.

    It is then correct to conduct a new trial, as there is no legal basis for reviving the old trial, which has been effectively terminated in the meantime. If the court comes to the conclusion that there are no defects, it will determine the effect of the settlement in terminating the proceedings by means of an appealable judgment.


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CONCLUSION

Anyone who believes that the involvement of the court ensures a “clean” settlement is mistaken!



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On the bias of judges in civil proceedings: If judges do not read a party’s pleadings, this can justify a motion for recusal!

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Quotes

Bias of judges in civil proceedings: When judges do not read a party's pleadings

Following my overview article on the application for bias according to § 42 ZPO I would like to report on an interesting judgment by the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe. According to this ruling, a judge’s failure to read the pleadings submitted by a party can give rise to concerns of bias. In the case in question, a judge had overlooked an application for recusal directed against him, as he had forwarded the pleading containing it unread to the opposing party for comment. This violates the so-called duty to wait pursuant to Section 47 (1) ZPO, according to which only “official acts that cannot be postponed” are permitted from the filing of an application for recusal until it has been dealt with

In its decision of 11.05.2022 (Ref. 9 W 24/22), the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe rightly ruled that a judge must read written pleadings! In its decision of 11.05.2022 (case no. 9 W 24/22), the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe made a very instructive statement on the criteria by which the question of bias is to be assessed:

In its decision of 11.05.2022 (Ref. 9 W 24/22), the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe rightly ruled that a judge must read written pleadings! In its decision of 11.05.2022 (case no. 9 W 24/22), the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe made a very instructive statement on the criteria by which the question of bias is to be assessed:

“(…) There are circumstances which are suitable to justify mistrust of the impartiality of the challenged judge at the Regional Court … justify.

1. the decisive factor is whether, from the point of view of a party, there is reason to doubt the impartiality and objective attitude of the judge when all circumstances are reasonably assessed. Only objective reasons come into consideration, although these must be considered from the perspective of the party. The circumstances of the individual case, which must be assessed in their entirety, are decisive. (See Zöller/Vollkommer, Code of Civil Procedure, 34th edition 2022, Section 42 ZPO para. 9 et seq. with case law references).

2. a concern of bias arises from the violation of the recused judge’s duty to wait pursuant to Section 47 (1) ZPO. According to the defendant’s motions for recusal, the recused judge was not authorized to issue the orders of 22.11.2021 (I, 208) and 03.12.2021 (I, 319). From the relevant perspective of the defendant, the violations allow the conclusion to be drawn that the judge clearly lacked diligence in perceiving and considering the defendant’s submissions (cf. on this aspect Zöller/Vollkommer, loc. cit., Section 42 ZPO para. 24 with case law references). From the defendant’s perspective, the infringements give rise to the fear that the rejected judge might not take the defendant’s submissions seriously in an appropriate manner, even in the event of a subsequent decision on the merits.

a) The violations by the rejected judge are serious. The duty to wait pursuant to Section 47 (1) ZPO is not merely of a formal nature; rather, it is an expression of the principle of the statutory judge, which is essential for civil proceedings. Official acts that cannot be postponed are not apparent in the orders of 22.11.2021 and 03.12.2021 and were not asserted by the rejected judge. The motions for recusal were, insofar as procedural errors by the judge in the period prior to the statement of defense were criticized, also admissible from the perspective of the recused judge and not an abuse of law. The orders of 22.11.2021 and 03.12.2021 were therefore not based on an incorrect, but justifiable, legal opinion of the judge (see BGH, decision of 07.03.2012 – AnwZ (B) 13/10 -, cited in Juris).

b) The double overlooking of the motions for recusal by the rejected judge is not comprehensible in the course of normal processing. (…)

The rejected judge’s reference that he only looked at the table of contents when responding to the complaint does not change anything. This does not meet the legitimate expectations of a party, regardless of the length of the pleading. Rather, the provision in section 139 (1) sentence 3 ZPO assumes – irrespective of the judge’s workload – that the judge constantly keeps an eye on the receipt of written pleadings to ensure appropriate procedural support (see Zöller/Greger, loc. cit., section 139 ZPO para. 4 c with references). This requires prompt knowledge of the content of the respective pleading.

Moreover, the judge’s reference to the table of contents of the statement of defense is not sufficient to explain the (first) breach of the duty to wait in the order of 22.11.2021. It is clear from the table of contents that the statements in the statement of defense “on the merits” do not begin until page 7, so that the judge had to expect other procedural statements at the beginning of the pleading (before the statements on the merits), which from the perspective of the defendant’s legal representative may have been of primary importance. The rejected judge also took note of the table of contents only incompletely at best, as the statement of defense was never served on the defendant (cf. I, 1 d) kk) of the table of contents).

In connection with the application for recusal, the defendant rightly points out that Judge at the Regional Court … as the representative of the recused judge promoted the proceedings in the main action by the orders of 10.01.2022 (I, 328) and 08.02.2022 (I, 342), although she was not authorized to do so pursuant to Section 47 (1) ZPO. If it had been a matter of an action that could not be postponed, only the dismissed judge, Judge at the Regional Court …, would have been authorized to decide on these measures himself. From the perspective of the defendant, the question arises as to whether the recused judge – in connection with his own violations of § 47 (1) ZPO – was of the incorrect opinion that, according to the recusal motion, the judge at the Regional Court … as his representative could promote the proceedings in the main action by taking appropriate measures until the final decision on the application for recusal.

c) An “obvious mistake” does not preclude the judge’s recusal.

a) According to the official statement of the dismissed judge dated 12.01.2022, it can be assumed that the violations of Section 47 (1) ZPO were due to an oversight (double overlooking of the motions for recusal). However, there are certain doubts as to whether this oversight was obvious from the relevant perspective of the defendant (see, for example, OLG Brandenburg, NJW-RR 2000, 1091, on an obvious oversight in the event of a breach of Section 47 (1) ZPO), or whether, from the defendant’s perspective, the possibility that the rejected judge did not take his duty to wait seriously was to be expected. However, this question is irrelevant for the decision of the Senate.

b) Even if one were to assume an obvious oversight on the part of the rejected judge, from the defendant’s perspective there are reasonable doubts as to the impartiality of the judge. This is because the oversight can only be explained by an evident lack of diligence on the part of the judge (see above in detail). This means that, from the defendant’s perspective, the errors of the rejected judge justify the fear that the rejected judge might not take sufficient account of the defendant’s submissions and viewpoints and take them seriously in the further conduct of the proceedings, in particular in a subsequent decision on the merits.”

selective focus of gavel near lawyer working at laptop isolated on grey

Conclusion

These statements show once again that concerns about a judge’s bias must be assessed from the perspective of the affected party, who cannot know what is really going on in the judge responsible. In the present case, the party concerned had rightly perceived the double “overlooking” of an application as grossly negligent. In such a case, it no longer matters whether the judge was negligent “by mistake”.


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BGH on the legal consequences of thwarting evidence

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Guide to procedural law: Important clarification from the Federal Court of Justice on the possible legal consequences of obstructing evidence

In legal disputes, it happens time and again that a party impedes the opponent’s presentation of evidence by thwarting evidence. In these cases, the practical question arises as to whether and, if so, with what legal consequences it can be assumed that evidence has been obstructed.

The clarifying BGH ruling of 16.11.2021 (case no. VI ZR 100/20) on the legal consequences of obstructing evidence

In a recent ruling, the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) made important findings in this regard and, in particular, eliminated a frequently encountered misconception that evidence is deemed to have been provided in the event of the obstruction of evidence. The BGH stated in its ruling of 16.11.2021 (case no. VI ZR 100/20):

“(…)

Contrary to the opinion of the appeal, however, the plaintiff is not deprived of proof of his allegations in this regard because he could be accused of obstructing evidence due to the sale of his vehicle in September 2017. Evidence can only be said to have been obstructed if the party not bearing the burden of proof culpably makes it impossible or more difficult for the opposing party bearing the burden of proof to provide evidence by destroying or withholding existing evidence or making its use more difficult (BGH, judgments of June 25, 1997 – VIII ZR 300/96, NJW 1997, 3311, juris para. 18; of June 11, 2015 – I ZR 226/13, WRP 2016, 35 para. 44 – Deltamethrin I mwN). However, by selling his vehicle, the plaintiff did not impede the defendant’s burden of proof, but at most his own. This is because he is obliged to provide evidence that his vehicle was completely and professionally repaired in accordance with the specifications of the pre-trial expert.

Apart from this, the assumption of a frustration of proof does not lead to the legal consequence claimed by the appeal. If the prerequisites for the obstruction of evidence by the opponent of the party with the burden of proof are met, the burden of proof may be eased in favor of the party with the burden of proof, which may in some circumstances go as far as reversing the burden of proof. The obstruction of evidence, on the other hand, does not mean that no evidence can be taken at all and that the submission of the party with the burden of proof would be considered proven (see BGH, judgment of June 11, 2015 – I ZR 226/13, loc. cit. para. 48 et seq. – Deltamethrin I mwN).

(…).


Approaching the bench in a courtroom with gavel and judge seat for law and order trial proceedings

Rating

This judgment on the possible legal consequences of the obstruction of evidence contains the following important findings for the conduct of proceedings:

  • Obstruction of evidence refers solely to the case where the party not bearing the burden of proof makes it impossible or difficult for the other party to provide evidence.
  • If necessary, the legal consequence in favor of the party with the burden of proof may be a reduction in the burden of proof and, under certain circumstances, a reversal of the burden of proof.
  • One of the possible legal consequences of the obstruction of evidence is not that the evidence is deemed to have been provided, with the result that the disputed fact would be deemed to have been proven.

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Guide to procedural law: Easier way to claim damages for exhaust gas manipulation – On the BGH ruling of June 26, 2023 (Ref. Via ZR 335/21)

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Close up of nozzles in diesel engine under opened bonnet

Guide to procedural law:
Easier way to claim damages for exhaust gas manipulation - On the BGH ruling of June 26, 2023 (Ref. Via ZR 335/21)

This article attempts to classify and evaluate the current ruling of the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) of June 26, 2023 (Ref. Via ZR 335/21) on the subject of compensation for damages due to emissions manipulation by car manufacturers.

The article first briefly examines the background of the diesel scandal dating back to 2015 as well as the first landmark ruling of the BGH from 2020 in order to then deal with the effects of the current ECJ ruling of March 21, 2023 (Ref. C-100/21), which laid the foundations for the amended BGH case law analyzed below.

A look back at 2015

The scandal surrounding emissions manipulation by car manufacturers dates back to 2015.

At the time, it turned out that VW had installed special software in the engine control unit to generate lower nitrogen oxide values on the test bench during emissions tests. In normal driving, however, the exhaust gas purification systems were deactivated in order to improve engine performance and fuel consumption. As a result, the vehicles did not comply with the statutory emission limits in real road traffic.

It later emerged that VW was not the only manufacturer to have “cheated” its way into supposed compliance with the statutory emission limits in the manner described above (or similar).

This resulted in waves of lawsuits from affected car buyers. The lawsuits were aimed at compensation for damages, reduction of the purchase price and rescission of contracts.


On the first landmark ruling of the BGH from 2020

In its first diesel ruling of 25.5.2020 (case no. VI ZR 252/19), the BGH ruled and confirmed the lower court in this respect that the fraudulent procurement of type approvals through emissions manipulation may also constitute a direct deception of the car buyer and, if necessary, a right of the buyer to compensation, and possibly also rescission, may be considered.

The guiding principles of the judgment were as follows:

a) It is equivalent to a direct fraudulent misrepresentation of vehicle purchasers if a vehicle manufacturer, in the context of a strategic decision taken by it during engine development, deliberately exploits the guilelessness and trust of vehicle purchasers by fraudulently deceiving the Federal Motor Transport Authority and then placing the vehicles thus falsified on the market.

b) If there are sufficient indications that at least one former member of the Management Board was aware of the strategic decision taken, the defendant manufacturer bears the secondary burden of proof for the assertion that such knowledge did not exist. It is irrelevant whether the former members of the Executive Board could be named as witnesses by the plaintiff.

c) If someone is induced by conduct giving rise to liability to conclude a contract that he would not otherwise have concluded, he may suffer pecuniary loss even if the performance and consideration are objectively valuable, because the performance is not fully usable for his purposes. However, the affirmation of financial loss under this aspect presupposes that the performance obtained through the unwanted contract is not only regarded as damage from a purely subjectively arbitrary point of view, but that the public opinion, taking into account the prevailing circumstances, also regards the conclusion of the contract as unreasonable, not appropriate to the specific financial interests and thus as disadvantageous.

d) The principles of equalization of benefits also apply to a claim for intentional immoral damage pursuant to Section 826 BGB.

This initially positive-sounding ruling meant that affected car buyers faced significant hurdles on the way to possible compensation, in particular:

  • According to the ruling at the time, a claim should require intent. Even though the BGH made it easier to provide evidence, the affected parties had to prove that the company managers had knowledge – possibly also “mediated” by employees.
  • Last but not least, the buyers concerned had difficulties with the necessary proof of loss. Thus, the BGH (see guiding principle 3 above) required that “the performance obtained through the unwanted contract is not only regarded as damage from a purely subjective arbitrary point of view, but that the public opinion (…) also regards the conclusion of the contract as (…) disadvantageous”.

The “prehistory” of the new BGH case law: The ECJ ruling of 21.3.2023 (Ref. C-100/21)

The overriding European law and thus the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is of essential importance for understanding the BGH’s changed case law in favor of consumers.

In an equally recent ruling of 21 March 2023 (case C-100/21), the ECJ laid the foundations for the current BGH case law by – contrary to previous BGH case law – granting individual protection to consumers under European type approval law. Paragraph 85 of the ECJ ruling states accordingly,

“(…) that Article 18 I, Article 26 I and Article 46 of the Framework Directive in conjunction with Article 5 II of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 must be interpreted as meaning that, in addition to general legal interests, they protect the individual interests of the individual purchaser of a motor vehicle against its manufacturer if this vehicle is equipped with an unlawful defeat device within the meaning of Article 5 II of this Regulation.”

As if that were not enough, the ECJ even derives a claim for damages in favor of the car buyer from European law if the buyer has suffered damage as a result of the defeat device. Paragraph 91 of the ECJ ruling states,

“(…) that it follows from Article 18 I, Article 26 I and Article 46 of the Framework Directive in conjunction with Article 5 II of Regulation No 715/2007 that the Member States must provide that the purchaser of a vehicle equipped with an unlawful defeat device within the meaning of Article 5 II of that regulation has a right to compensation from the manufacturer of that vehicle if the purchaser has suffered damage as a result of that defeat device (…)”

The ECJ goes even further and admonishes the Member States to ensure that consumers actually benefit from this “European right to compensation”. According to the ECJ, this includes ensuring that the hurdles for consumers to obtain such compensation are not set too high. The ECJ ruling states this in paragraphs 92 and 93:

“92In the absence of provisions of Union law on the arrangements for obtaining such compensation by the purchasers concerned on account of the acquisition of such a vehicle, it is for each Member State to determine those arrangements.

93 However, national legislation which makes it practically impossible or excessively difficult for the purchaser of a motor vehicle to obtain adequate compensation for the damage caused to him by the manufacturer of that vehicle’s infringement of the prohibition laid down in Article 5(II) of Regulation No 715/2007 is not consistent with the principle of effectiveness.”

In short, the above-mentioned ECJ ruling is an obligatory instruction to the Member States that they must ensure that claims for damages by consumers due to exhaust gas manipulations that violate European type approval law do not remain mere theory.

On the new diesel ruling of the BGH of June 26, 2023 (Ref. Via ZR 335/21)

The ruling now issued by the BGH on June 26, 2023 (Ref. Via ZR 335/21) aims to implement the aforementioned requirements of the ECJ.

As a result, the BGH has significantly lowered the hurdles for claims for damages by diesel buyers in Germany, although (see my outlook at the end of this article) it seems questionable whether the BGH has gone far enough in accommodating consumers.

According to the amended BGH case law, vehicle manufacturers may in future be liable to pay compensation even if they have “only” acted negligently.

In addition, the BGH has implemented the further requirement of the ECJ, according to which car buyers must also have an effective way of obtaining compensation, by awarding affected consumers compensation in a range of 5 to 15 % of the purchase price without the need for an expert opinion.

In detail:

EC type approval cannot exclude claims for damages

In its ruling, the BGH first of all clarifies once again that neither an EC type approval granted nor an additional certificate of conformity can be suitable to exclude a tortious claim by the car buyer from the outset.

The decisive factor is that EC type approvals and any additional certificates of conformity only have effect with regard to a specific vehicle type, but the decisive factor for a claim under tort law is whether the specific vehicle purchased is affected.

Reversal (“major” compensation) still only in the case of intentional, immoral damage

The BGH continues to hold that “major” damages can only be claimed in the event of intentional immoral damage. In the event that a buyer’s trust in the correctness of the certificate of conformity is disappointed, he cannot demand that the vehicle manufacturer takes back the vehicle and refunds the purchase price less any benefits obtained.

Although European emissions law also protects the individual car buyer against the manufacturer if the vehicle purchased is equipped with an unlawful defeat device, the BGH stated verbatim (see para. 22 of the judgment):

“Union law, as clarified by the judgment of the Court of Justice of March 21, 2023, nevertheless does not require the purchaser of a motor vehicle equipped with an unlawful defeat device to be placed in the same position as if he had not concluded the purchase contract, i.e. to include the interest in rescinding the purchase contract in the material scope of protection of Section 6 (1), Section 27 (1) EG-FGV.”

The BGH further justifies this with, among other things, the limited wrongfulness of a “merely” culpable violation of a protective law in relation to an immoral, intentional damage.

The BGH sees no requirement in EU law and the case law of the ECJ to the effect that national law must provide for a right to rescission. It refers to the fact that the ECJ only requires sanctions that must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. It also refers to a ruling by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Austria on April 25, 2023, which – for Austria – had affirmed a claim for major damages. The BGH considers this case law to be based on modalities of national Austrian law. It then also takes from the judgment of the Supreme Court that the Supreme Court itself assumes that EU law does not require the award of large damages.

Claim for compensation for so-called differential damages due to negligent violation of EU emissions legislation

The BGH then concedes that a negligent violation of EU emissions legislation – in the form of an impermissible defeat device – can justify a claim by the car buyer for compensation for the so-called differential damage.

In this respect, the ECJ stated that the so-called declaration of conformity pursuant to Article 26(1) of Directive 2007/46/EC provides individual protection for the vehicle purchaser, which is also aimed at ensuring that the purchased vehicle complies with all relevant legal acts. According to the ECJ, the right to register the vehicle in any Member State without further technical documentation is derived in particular from the declaration of conformity.

According to the case law of the ECJ, this reasoning in turn leads to a link between the declaration of conformity and the consumer’s individual purchase decision. This in turn corresponds to the principle established by the BGH that

“a buyer purchasing a vehicle for his own use would have refrained from purchasing the vehicle if he had been aware of the risk of an operating restriction or prohibition

(see para. 30 of the judgment).

As a result, the BGH stated (see para. 32 of the judgment):

“The interest, which is therefore protected under EU law, not to suffer a loss of assets in the sense of the difference hypothesis by concluding a purchase contract for a motor vehicle due to a violation of European emissions law by the vehicle manufacturer, is protected by Section 823 (2) BGB in conjunction with Section 6 (1), Section 27 (1) EG-FGV according to the required interpretation of EU law. (…)”

Necessity of fault on the part of the car manufacturer

The BGH continues to demand fault on the part of the car manufacturer.

The BGH concedes that the ECJ did not deal with a fault requirement. However, the ECJ – which seems questionable to me (!) – did not directly derive a claim for damages due to an unlawful defeat device from Union law, but merely demanded such a claim to be defined in more detail by the Member States. With reference to the national law of the Federal Republic of Germany, the BGH upholds the culpability requirement and has explained this (see para. 37 of the judgment):

“According to its wording, § 823 para. 2 sentence 2 BGB does not permit an obligation to pay compensation independent of fault on the part of the injuring party. Rather, according to § 823 para. 2 sentence 2 BGB, if a violation of the protective law is also possible without fault according to the content of the protective law, the obligation to pay compensation only arises in the event of fault. Even if the limits of permissible interpretation of the law are exhausted, there is therefore no question of deriving strict liability from Section 823 (2) BGB. Nothing else applies with regard to the possibility of an interpretation in conformity with EU law. According to the case law of the Court of Justice, such an interpretation of national law finds its limit in the will of the national legislator expressed in the law (ECJ, judgment of January 22, 2019 – C-193/17, NZA 2019, 297 para. 74 mwN).”

If the affected car buyer has proven the existence of an unlawful defeat device, the vehicle manufacturer still has the option of demonstrating and proving that it neither acted intentionally nor negligently failed to recognize that the vehicle did not comply with EU regulations. If the vehicle manufacturer succeeds in doing so, it will not be liable in future either! This is because German tort law always presupposes fault on the part of the tortfeasor for tortious liability. According to the BGH, the German courts cannot impose tortious liability regardless of fault, which must also be decided in accordance with the requirements of the ECJ within the framework of the applicable national law.

Necessity of a reduction in assets – differential damages always to be assumed

For negligence cases, the BGH continues to adhere to the general principle that a claim for damages requires a reduction in assets due to the disappointed investment of trust when concluding the purchase contract for the motor vehicle.

Based on the ECJ’s requirement to grant consumers an “effective claim for damages”, the BGH links the required reduction in assets to the availability of a motor vehicle at all times, which in itself has a monetary value.

With “regard to the monetary advantage of the availability of a motor vehicle at any time”, “the legal possibility of a restriction of use, which is given with the use of an inadmissible defeat device” (see para. 42 of the judgment), is sufficient to assume damage to the detriment of the car buyer.

Accordingly, the buyer of a vehicle equipped with an impermissible defeat device within the meaning of Union law always suffers damage because the availability of the vehicle is in question due to the threat of an operating restriction or operating ban.

According to the BGH, the aforementioned principle of experience applies in favor of the buyer, namely that if the vehicle had been equipped with an unlawful defeat device, the buyer would not have purchased the vehicle at the agreed price. Accordingly, the necessary comparison of assets must be based on the time at which the contract was concluded.

Amount of damage in the range of 5% to 15% of the purchase price paid

Based on the requirements of the ECJ, according to which national law must provide an effective sanction for the violation of Union law, the BGH further ruled that the individual buyer must always be granted compensation in the amount of at least 5% and a maximum of 15% of the purchase price paid, without the need for a damage assessment.

The BGH justified the estimation of damages within this range by stating that, on the one hand, a minimum amount of damages is required to ensure sufficiently effective sanctions, but on the other hand, it must be taken into account that reasons of proportionality and the cumulative effect affecting the manufacturer as a result of multiple sales require an upper limit.

The BGH explained the reasons for the estimation range in detail (see para. 72 et seq. of the judgment):

“Pursuant to Section 287 (1) sentence 1 ZPO, the trial judge must estimate the amount of the damage in his free judgment, taking into account all the circumstances. By granting the power to estimate damages, the law accepts that the result of the estimate does not fully reflect reality as long as it comes as close as possible to it. (…)

In cases where a buyer relies on the accuracy of the certificate of conformity when purchasing a motor vehicle equipped with an unlawful defeat device, the estimation of the differential damage is subject to EU law requirements. (…)

For reasons of effectiveness under EU law, the estimated damage cannot be less than 5% of the purchase price paid. Otherwise, the sanctioning of an even merely negligent infringement of Art. 5 (2) sentence 1 of Regulation (EC) No. 715/2007 would not be sufficiently effective with regard to the promotion of the objectives of Union law due to its insignificance. (…)

Conversely, damages owed solely under Section 823 (2) BGB in conjunction with Section 6 (1), Section 27 (1) EG-FGV and not also under Sections 826, 31 BGB cannot be higher than 15% of the purchase price paid for reasons of proportionality. Liability pursuant to Section 823 (2) BGB in conjunction with Section 6 (1), Section 27 (1) EG-FGV covers cases of objectively comparatively minor infringements of the law, which the legislator has merely classified as an administrative offense. In addition, liability pursuant to Section 823 (2) BGB in conjunction with Section 6 (1), Section 27 (1) EG-FGV applies to the vehicle manufacturer several times in relation to a single motor vehicle in the event of multiple sales, so that a cumulative effect can occur. (…)

According to the BGH, the exact determination within this range is the responsibility of the trial judge, who can exercise his discretionary power of estimation without having to obtain expert advice beforehand.

Outlook

This BGH ruling will not be the last on the diesel scandal.

The judgment shows the comprehensible and welcome efforts of the BGH to limit the ECJ’s interference in the regulation of tort law claims, which is in principle the sole responsibility of the Member States, to a minimum. This is particularly evident in the culpability requirement, to which the BGH adheres with seemingly “spasmodic” reasoning, although the ECJ requires every Member State to provide a claim for damages based solely on an unlawful defeat device.

Close up of nozzles in diesel engine under opened bonnet

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ZPO guide: Submission of evidence after the taking of evidence

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ZPO guide: Submission of evidence after the taking of evidence

The Federal Court of Justice generally sets strict requirements for the existence of the prerequisites for a rejection of a party’s submission due to delay.

In a case of practical relevance, an appellate court had conducted a taking of evidence and then, as is customary, granted the parties a certain period of time to comment on the results of the taking of evidence. Within this period, the party providing evidence referred to a witness who had not yet been named. The court of appeal wrongly disregarded this request for evidence and wrongly ruled that it was late, as the BGH found in its decision of March 23, 2021 (case no. II ZR 80/20). The reason for this is that the opportunity to comment on the results of the taking of evidence is tantamount to an indulgence in pleadings, thereby postponing the conclusion of the oral hearing.

The judgment

The BGH stated:

(…)

Article 103 (1) of the Basic Law obliges the court to take note of and consider the submissions of the parties to the proceedings. In this sense, Art. 103 Para. 1 GG in conjunction with the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure requires the consideration of significant requests for evidence. The non-consideration of a significant offer of evidence violates Article 103 (1) of the Basic Law if it is not supported by procedural law (established case law, BGH, decision of October 20, 2020 – VII ZR 577/19, NJW-RR 2021, 58 marginal no. 9 with further references).

The Court of Appeal was not permitted to reject the defendant’s request to take evidence from his wife as a witness pursuant to Section 296a ZPO.

Contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeal, the defendant did not submit the request for evidence after the conclusion of the oral hearing. The Court of Appeal also gave the defendant the opportunity to comment on the taking of evidence and granted a deadline for written submissions, which the defendant complied with. By granting a deadline for written submissions, the conclusion of the oral hearing is extended for the affected party with regard to the admissible reply until the deadline expires (see BGH, judgment of April 21, 2015 – II ZR 255/13, NJW-RR 2015, 893 para. 12).

The timeliness of the request for evidence cannot be called into question because it would have been an inadmissible submission with regard to the time limit. The right to comment on the result of the taking of evidence also includes the right to submit new requests for evidence (BGH, judgment of October 25, 2013 – V ZR 147/12, NJW 2014, 550 marginal no. 25 with further references).

The considerations of the Court of Appeal that the defendant was obliged to submit his request for evidence earlier are irrelevant. These statements are irrelevant for the requirements of Section 296a ZPO . The extent to which these circumstances can justify a rejection of the submission of evidence on the basis of other preclusion provisions (§ 531 Para. 2, §§ 530, 296 Para. 1, § 525 Sentence 1 in conjunction with §§ 282, 296 Para. 2 ZPO) does not need to be decided here. §§ Sections 282, 296 (2) ZPO), no decision is required here because the Federal Court of Justice, as the appellate court, is prohibited from basing the rejection on provisions other than those applied by the lower court (BGH, default judgment of February 22, 2006 – IV ZR 56/05, NJW 2006, 1741 para. 12; decision of March 21, 2013 – VII ZR 58/12, NJW-RR 2013, 655 para. 11).

(…)


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My rating:

The judgment must be upheld, as the assumption of delay has far-reaching consequences for the party concerned. In the present case, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning for the assumed delay was not supported by the Code of Civil Procedure. The BGH did not have to decide on other grounds for delay that the Court of Appeal had not taken into consideration.

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Guide: International Civil Procedure Law – On the suspension of the statute of limitations by bringing an action under the EU Service Regulation (EUZVO)

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Europe

Suspension of the statute of limitations by bringing an action under the EU Service Regulation (EUZVO)

The EU Service Regulation (EUZVO) regulates the transmission of judicial documents in EU legal transactions and also has considerable significance for the suspension of the statute of limitations. Although the EU Service Regulation is not new, the courts are constantly dealing with issues relating to international service. One important aspect concerns the requirements for an effective suspension of the limitation period by filing an action. If actions are filed with the court at the last minute – as is frequently and generally permissible – Section 167 ZPO applies. This reads:

“If a time limit is to be observed by service or the limitation period is to begin anew or be suspended pursuant to Section 204 of the German Civil Code, this effect shall take effect upon receipt of the application or declaration if service is effected shortly .”

“Immediately” requires the plaintiff to have done everything reasonable to ensure that service can take place as quickly as possible. An example of this is the payment of the advance on costs that is usually requested, which the plaintiff must pay immediately.

In this context, the EUTMR raised a question that the BGH dealt with not long ago in its judgment of 25.02.2021 (case no. IX ZR 156/19). In the author’s opinion, the lower court, the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt, had previously made a clear error of judgment, which the BGH corrected in an insightful ruling on various questions of the EUTMR.

Problem description

It is about the following:

The EUTMR provides for options for the claimant with regard to the attachment of the translation of the claim (see Article 8 (1) to (3) of the EUTMR).

The plaintiff has the choice of whether or not to include a translation into the defendant’s language with the claim from the outset. The recipient can then refuse to receive the claim by returning it if he does not understand the plaintiff’s language. If the refusal of acceptance was justified, the service must be made up for with a translation. In the present case, the plaintiff had decided to enclose a translation from the outset. A very considerable period of time elapsed before service with translation was effected. This was – clearly wrongly! – The Frankfurt Higher Regional Court blamed the plaintiff for this, as the plaintiff would have had the option of initially sending the claim to the defendant without a translation and therefore more quickly.

The BGH ruling

The Federal Court of Justice convincingly rejected the opinion of the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt regarding the effective suspension of the limitation period under the EU Regulation.

The BGH first made the following general statements with regard to the EU foreign service of process and the question of the suspension of the statute of limitations under the EU Regulation:

(…)

If a time limit is to be observed by service, this effect shall take effect in accordance with Section 167 ZPO (German Code of Civil Procedure), this effect already occurs upon receipt of the application or declaration if service is effected shortly.

(…)

It is true that the action was only served on December 9, 2016 and therefore more than eleven months after the expiry of the limitation period. However, this is harmless because service was “imminent” within the meaning of Section 167 ZPO.

(…)

This should not be based on a purely temporal approach. Rather, because service is effected ex officio, the parties should be protected from disadvantages caused by delays within the court’s business operations, as they cannot influence these delays. There is therefore no absolute time limit beyond which service can no longer be regarded as “imminent”. This also applies if there are delays lasting several months. Delays in the service procedure that are caused by incorrect handling of the matter by the court do not have to be attributed to the party who is responsible for meeting the deadline.

(…)

However, the party is responsible for delays that are not merely minor and that they or their legal representative (Section 85 (2) ZPO) could have avoided if they had conducted the proceedings conscientiously (BGH, judgment of September 12, 2019, loc. cit.). Delays are therefore attributable if the party or their legal representative has contributed to a delay in service that is not merely minor through negligent – even slightly negligent – conduct.

(…)

Measured against this, there is no delay in service caused by the plaintiff.

(…)

Pursuant to Art. 5 (1) Brussels I Regulation, the transmitting agency must inform the party requesting service (“applicant”) of the risk of a possible refusal of acceptance by the addressee of a document that is not drafted or translated (Art. 8 (1) Brussels I Regulation) into one of the languages listed in Art. 8 Brussels I Regulation. Nevertheless, it is up to the applicant to decide whether a translation of the document in question is required, the costs of which must be borne by the applicant in accordance with Art. 5 (2) of the Brussels I Regulation (ECJ, judgment of September 16, 2015 – C-519/13, Alpha Bank Cyprus, RIW 2015, 748 para. 35). In this respect, he has the right to choose.

(…)

If the party initiating service decides to effect service without translation, the rights of the addressee are protected pursuant to Art. 8 (1) of the EU Regulation by the fact that the addressee can refuse acceptance if the documents are written in a language that he does not understand and that is not the official language of the receiving state (see BGH, decision of December 21, 2006 – VII ZR 164/05, NJW 2007, 775 para. 16). The recipient is informed of this in the form in accordance with Annex II of the EU Regulation, which must be handed over to him with the service.

(…)

As an interim conclusion on the requirements for a suspension of the limitation period under the EUTMR, it can be stated that

  • the requirement of “imminent” service requires the plaintiff to contribute to undelayed service. Purely judicial omissions are irrelevant.
  • the EUTMR grants the plaintiff options for EU international service that have an influence on the (initial, possibly untranslated) service.

On the question of whether the plaintiff could be restricted in his options in order to comply with the “imminent” requirement (according to the OLG Frankfurt), the BGH then made the following appropriate statements:

(…)

The party effecting service cannot be held responsible for delays resulting from the choice of service made by him in accordance with Art. 5 and Art. 8 of the EU Regulation. However, this question has not yet been clarified by the supreme court and is disputed in the literature.

On the one hand, the literature takes the view that the applicant may not, within the framework of Section 167 ZPO, select any of the service options regulated in the EU Regulation that would lead to more than a minor delay; rather, there is an obligation to make use of the options for accelerated service to the extent that they are opened up by the EU Regulation (see Musielak/Voit/Stadler, ZPO, 17th ed, Art. 8 EuZVO para. 1; Nagel/Gottwald/Gottwald, Internationales Zivilprozessrecht, 8th ed., § 8 para. 8.67; Hüßtege/Mansel/Brand, Rom-Verordnungen, 3rd ed, Das anwaltliche Mandat im internationalen Schuldrecht, para. 45; Kern/Diehm/Diehm, ZPO, 2nd ed., section 167 para. 10; BeckOK-ZPO/Dörndorfer, 2020, section 167 para. 4; Kuntze-Kaufhold/Beichel-Benedetti, NJW 2003, 1998, 1999; Grootens, MDR 2019, 1046, 1047). On the other hand, a freedom of choice opened up by law – as here by the EU Regulation – should not be able to tighten the obligations of Section 167 ZPO (Zöller/Greger, ZPO, 33rd ed., Section 167 para. 15; Niehoff, IWRZ 2019, 232; Hess, IPRax 2020, 127, 128).

The latter view is correct. It does not constitute negligent service of process to make use of a method of service opened up by the Brussels I Regulation, even if this may delay service compared to other options. There is neither an obligation nor a duty on the part of the party effecting service to have the action served without translation.

(…)

In each individual case, the national court must ensure balanced protection of the respective rights of the parties concerned by weighing the objective of effectiveness and speed of service in the interest of the applicant against the objective of effective protection of the rights of defense of the addressee (ECJ, judgment of 8 November 2005 – C-443/03, Leffler, ECR 2005, I-09611 para. 68; order of 28 April 2016 – C-384/14, Alta Realitat S.L, juris para. 58).

This is not compatible with the argument – also taken up by the Court of Appeal – that service without translation is “not dangerous” for the applicant with regard to Article 8 (3) sentence 3 of the EU Regulation (see Fabig/Windau, NJW 2017, 2502, 2503; Grootens, MDR 2019, 1046, 1047). In this light, the applicant cannot be instructed to attempt service without translation in order to meet the deadline. The assumption of such an obligation would make this type of service the rule (see Hess, IPRax 2020, 127). However, this would not take sufficient account of the interests of either the recipient or the applicant.

On the one hand, it is not in line with the objective of the EU Regulation that the applicant always exercises his right of choice regardless of the language skills of the recipient.

(…)

Secondly, the assumption of an obligation to first attempt service without translation does not take into account the legitimate interests of the applicant. He would be obliged to take the risk of a justified refusal to accept service by the addressee in accordance with Art. 8 (1) EC Regulation even if he knows for certain that the addressee does not speak the language. If the recipient actually makes use of his right to refuse acceptance, this is disadvantageous for the applicant in several respects, which in turn result from Art. 8 (1) and (3) of the EU Regulation. A new service must be made, which in principle takes effect ex nunc for the time limits to be observed by the applicant (see Eichel, IPRax 2017, 352, 353 with further references). With regard to Art. 8 para. 3 sentence 3 Brussels I Regulation, the applicant now faces an additional risk of limitation because he cannot wait indefinitely for the new service and it is unclear how long he has to do so (see para. 26).

In addition, the refusal of acceptance results in a delay in the proceedings. This is not only due to the fact that a translation has to be prepared and the service repeated after all. Rather, the loss of time is also caused by the fact that Art. 8 para. 3 sentence 3 of the EU Regulation restricts the retroactive effect to the “relationship with the applicant”. This is because the service of the document instituting the proceedings must not lead to the expiry of time limits for the defense at the expense of the addressee as long as the latter is unable to understand the content of the document (see ECJ, judgment of 8 November 2005 – C-443/03, Leffler, ECR 2005, I-09611 para. 67 f; see also Eichel, IPRax 2017, 352, 353). Therefore, the time limit for filing a statement of defense pursuant to Art. 8 para. 3 sentence 2 Brussels I Regulation does not begin to run until the translation is served (see Rauscher/Heiderhoff, Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht, 4th ed., vol. 2, A.II.1, Art. 8 para. 24).

Restricting the right of choice provided for in Article 5(1) of the EUTMR would ultimately also mean preventing the service operator from taking the safest route. Even if he has positive knowledge of the recipient’s language skills and a translation would then be unnecessary, there is a risk that the recipient will (unjustifiably) refuse acceptance. A dispute about the legitimacy of the refusal to accept (see Geimer/Schütze/Geimer, Europäisches Zivilverfahrensrecht, 4th ed., Art. 8 EuZVO para. 9 ff) can considerably delay the proceedings. Against this background, it does not appear reasonable to require the applicant to take a course of action within the framework of Section 167 ZPO that may be associated with procedural disadvantages for him.

(…)

As a further interim conclusion, it should be noted that, according to the correct statements of the Federal Court of Justice on the requirements for an effective suspension of the limitation period under the EU Regulation

  • the plaintiff has a reasoned choice under the EUTMR as to whether he wishes to be served with or without translation,
  • service with translation is the safest way for the plaintiff,
  • the obligatory service without translation would entail unreasonable risks for the plaintiff in view of the limitation period, and
  • delivery initially without translation can ultimately lead to a significant delay in delivery.

Finally, the BGH “rounded off” by clarifying that the plaintiff is also free to decide whether to have the translation done himself or via the court. The BGH commented on this:

(…)

It also does not constitute negligent conduct of the proceedings not to provide the translation yourself but to have it commissioned by the court.

On the one hand, a plaintiff may wait until the last day before the expiry of the limitation period to file a claim without this being counted as fault (see BGH, judgment of April 7, 1983 – III ZR 140/81, VersR 1983, 661, 663; of May 18, 1995 – VII ZR 191/94, NJW 1995, 2230, 2231). On the other hand, he must then do everything reasonable to create the conditions for prompt service (BGH, decision of March 29, 2018 – III ZB 135/17, NJW-RR 2018, 763 para. 16; judgment of December 10, 2019 – II ZR 281/18, WM 2020, 276 para. 8; in each case with further references). According to the case law of the Federal Court of Justice, it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to provide all cooperation required for proper service of process; once the plaintiff has provided this cooperation, the further responsibility for the proper course of the service procedure lies exclusively in the hands of the court, whose course of business cannot be directly influenced by a plaintiff and their legal representative (cf. BGH, judgment of July 12, 2006 – IV ZR 23/05, BGHZ 168, 306 para. 20; see also BAG, judgment of August 23, 2012 – 8 AZR 394/11, BAGE 143, 50 para. 31 f). There is no legal basis for an obligation or duty on the part of the plaintiff and his legal representative to work towards the greatest possible acceleration even at this stage of the proceedings by monitoring the court’s actions. It does not arise from the relationship under procedural law because the plaintiff, for his part, has already done everything that the Code of Civil Procedure requires of him for service of process (BGH, judgment of July 12, 2006, loc. cit. para. 21; of October 1, 2019 – II ZR 169/18, juris para. 10 mwN; see also BAG, judgment of February 15, 2012 – 10 AZR 711/10, juris para. 48).

(…)”


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Conclusion

The statements of the Federal Court of Justice on the suspension of the statute of limitations under the EU Regulation are to be endorsed in every respect.

The arguments to the contrary are particularly flawed by the fact that obligations and risks are imposed on the plaintiff without a legal basis. It is also difficult to see what interests of the defendant worthy of protection could conflict with this. The defendant, who does not understand a lawsuit, cannot do anything with it. The supposed attempt to speed up service is therefore futile. And even if the untranslated claim is “understood” in individual cases, the only benefit for the defendant is to learn of the claim against him some time earlier, which in most cases is hardly significant.

Please also read my article on the effectiveness requirements for EU international delivery!

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Read more "


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Copyright 2026 © All rights reserved.