Contract law: Stuttgart 21 and the speech clause – a lesson in clear contract drafting
/in Contract Law, Nicht kategorisiertLEGAL+ NEWS

In contract law, sometimes a single sentence can decide billions. This is exactly what happened with the Stuttgart 21 project. At the center of the legal dispute was a short contractual provision – the so-called “speech clause”. It was intended to ensure a willingness to talk in the event of additional costs, but was understood by Deutsche Bahn as a basis for additional payments. This argument did not stand up in court. The decisions of the Administrative Court of Stuttgart and the Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg are a prime example of how contracts should be interpreted – and what happens if they remain too vague.
Part 1: The judgment on Stuttgart 21 as a textbook case in contract law
In a ruling dated May 7, 2024 (case no. 13 K 9542/16), the Stuttgart Administrative Court dismissed Deutsche Bahn’s claim for cost sharing by the project partners in the Stuttgart 21 project. The Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg rejected the application for leave to appeal in its ruling dated August 1, 2025 (case no. 14 S 1737/24). The ruling is therefore legally binding. The dispute concerns a public law financing agreement with a volume in the double-digit billion range. At the center of the legal dispute is a single clause: the so-called “speech clause”.
This reads:
“In the event of further cost increases, the EIU and the state will enter into talks.”
Deutsche Bahn had argued that an obligation to subsequently increase the financing contributions could be derived from this regulation. The courts have clearly denied this.
The decision of the VG Stuttgart and its explicit confirmation by the VGH Baden-Württemberg can be considered an exemplary case for the systematic interpretation of contracts. They show how wording, systematics, drafting history and purpose interact – and what consequences unclear or strategically open regulations can have.
1. wording of the speech clause
In the event of further cost overruns, the clause merely regulates the obligation to enter into discussions. No material claim to cost sharing can be derived from the mere requirement to hold discussions. The term “discussions” is too unspecific in legal terms to justify legal obligations in the form of additional payments.
2. systematics of the contract
The speech clause follows a graduated and quantified financing regulation. This structure suggests that a substantive obligation ends with the last quantified contribution and is replaced by a procedural clause that has no legal consequences beyond the communication obligation. The lack of a distribution key shows that no further obligation to pay was deliberately intended.
3. historical interpretation
The clause was created after several draft versions in which – partly on the initiative of the railroads – an explicit rejection of automatic additional payments was envisaged. The development shows: The parties did not want a binding regulation of further contributions.
4. teleological interpretation
The purpose of the speech clause was not to establish an obligation to continue the project or to co-finance it, but at most to create a basis for discussion for amicable solutions. An obligation to reach an agreement or to pay cannot be derived from this.
5. no supplementary interpretation of the contract
There is no gap in the contract that could be closed by an amendment. The clearly staggered financing up to a maximum amount and the waiver of automatic updating were an expression of deliberate risk limitation.
6. no interference with the basis of the transaction
The principle of frustration of contract did not help Deutsche Bahn either. The parties had expressly agreed that in the event of additional costs, payment would only be made in writing, not automatically.

For me, the ruling is a lesson in contract law: contracts do not live from euphonious formulations, but from clear, robust provisions.
I see this as a prime example of a central problem in many contract negotiations: When economic compromises are translated into non-binding language. The result is seemingly elegant formulations that have no substance in the event of a dispute – just like here.
Anyone who uses regulations only as a diplomatic formula, but does not back them up with legal obligation, is building on sand. This can be fatal for large projects. Contracts need to be thought of like processes: resistant to dispute, resistant to interpretation, strategically sound. And vice versa: a judgment is always the result of the contract on which the process is based.
In contract law, good clauses are not created through harmony, but through the struggle for clear solutions. Those who evade in negotiations will lose in a dispute. The speech clause shows what happens when, instead of clarity, only a willingness to talk is agreed – and thus the actual conflict is postponed.
About RA Daniel Meier-Greve
Daniel Meier-Greve is a lawyer based in Hamburg. He advises and represents clients in complex commercial law disputes – out of court and in court. His work focuses on contract drafting and litigation.
He does not view the two separately: anyone who drafts contracts must also think about the dispute – and anyone who conducts litigation should understand how contracts are created. This change of perspective characterizes his legal work – and is the basis of his advice.
About Legal+
Legal+ stands for legal advice with a strategic view: Drafting and disputes belong together. A contract is not an end, but a means – to manage risk, to balance interests, to prepare for a dispute. Legal+ thinks contracts in terms of conflict – and conducts proceedings with the knowledge of how they came about.

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